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TARDIVE DYSKINESIA: REDUCING
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXPOSURE
THROUGH A RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
John Baker*
INTRODUCTION
An academic physician once postulated a truism accepted by most
clinicians, but often disregarded by both the lay and legal communities:
"Few drugs that help anybody will not hurt somebody, and all potent
drugs, no matter how skillfully used, can cause untoward effects in some
patients."' Antipsychotic drugs are extremely helpful in pharmacotherapy
and have, likewise, revolutionized the treatment of schizophrenia!
Antipsychotic drugs are also effective in treating "paranoid and
schizophreniform disorders, brief reactive psychoses, schizoaffective
disorders, atypical psychoses, manic episodes, major depressive disorders
with psychotic features, certain organic psychoses, and some borderline
patients."3 Further, these drugs are credited with substantially decreasing
the number of mentally ill hospital patients.4
An estimated three million Americans were prescribed antipsychotic
drugs in 1986, and 945,000 new patients are prescribed antipsychotic
drugs each year.5 The only efficacious drug treatment for schizophrenia
*Fgfgfg. B.A., Notre Dame, 1988; J.D., Notre Dame, 1993; LL.M. in Health Law, DaPaul
University, 1997.
'Smith & Simon, Tardive Dy kinesia Revisited. A Major Hcalth Crisis, 31 MEDICAL TPIAL
TECHNIQUE QUARTERLY 342 (1985), quoted in Koch-Weser, Fatal Rcactions to Drug Thcrapy,
292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 302-303 (1974).
2See H. KAPLAN, SYNOpSis OF PSyCHIATRY 1111 (1994).
3Davis et at, Clinical and Legal Issues in Neurolkptic Use, 6 CIr'IcAL
NEuRoPmHAACOLOGY 117, 118 (1983).4Smith & Simon, supra note 1, at 344.
5C. Thomas Gualtieri, M.D. et al., Tardi'e DysIdnesia Litigation and the Ddcmmas of
Neuroleptic Treatment, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY& LAw 187,204 (1936).
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is antipsychotic drugs.6 Significantly, these drugs enable millions of
people to lead healthy and more productive lives, however, not without
costly side effects7 that may include: acute dystonic reactions,
Parkinsonian Syndrome, akathisia, akinesia, Rabbit Syndrome, and
Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome.'
One of the more serious side effects of antipsychotic drugs is Tardive
Dyskinesia (TD).9 TD is a disorder characterized by involuntary
movements of the face, trunk, or extremities, and is often associated with
the prolonged exposure to dopamine receptor drugs such as antipsychotic
drugs.'0 Involuntary movements include: frowning, blinking, grimacing,
puckering, chewing, smacking, rolling of the tongue, foot tapping, and
rocking of the hips." Other drugs, such as the antidepressant amoxapine,
and the antiemetic agents metoclopramide and prochlorperazine, are also
known to cause TD.
2
The term "tardive" refers to the fact that the condition usually
develops only after a prolonged antipsychotic drug regimen of at least six
months, whereas "dyskinesia" refers to the involuntary movements
resulting from the actual drug use. 3 "Neuroleptics" is another name for
antipsychotic medications, and the name itself suggests these drugs may
produce undesirable side effects on the central nervous system. 4 It is
'See Brakel & Davis, Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental Patients and the Right
to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429,449 (1991).
'See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 905 (A. Hayes & S. Yudoksky eds., 1994) [hereinafter
HAYES & YUDOSKY].
'Id. at 909. Acute dystonic reactions include bizarre and sustained postures of the face, jaw,
tongue, neck, and trunk. These reactions can occur within days after starting medication and can
disappear when the drugs are discontinued. Akathisia can be defined as motor restlessness which
is relieved by moving. It also gradually disappears when the drugs are discontinued. Drug-induccd
Parkinsonism causes patients to exhibit the tremors and rigidity of those afflicted with Parkinson's
disease, but can also be treated effectively with drugs. Akinesia is defined as a behavioral state
of diminished spontaneity characterized by few gestures, unspontaneous speech, and apathy.
Rabbit syndrome consists of rapid movements of the lips that mimic those of a rabbit. This
syndrome, too, can be easily treated. Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a rare but potentially
fatal disorder characterized by mental status changes, rigidity, delirium, sever. anxiety, mutism,






"See 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2005 (H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, 6th




relatively rare that TD's effects are considered disabling, since few people
suffering from this disease experience difficulty walking, breathing,
eating, or talking.-' Nevertheless, because 10 to 20 percent of those
patients treated with antipsychotic drugs for more than one year
experience TD, the administration of these drugs has recently stirred much
controversy and subsequent litigation affecting the psychiatric field. 16
Although advocates in the medical and legal communities recognize
the risks of antipsychotic drug use, many lose sight of the benefits
associated with these drugs, a fact that often frustrates the medical
community." Notably, antipsychotic drugs allow millions of people to
return to work or school, and often mean the difference between
institutionalization and community living for the patient."8 In the event a
patient discontinues antipsychotic drug treatment, relapse is often
inevitable, painful, and costly.'9 In addition, the deteriorating effects of
discontinuation are potentially irreversible." Consequently, the
repercussions associated with either relapse or untreated schizophrenia
affect the patient family members, mental institutions, and society in
general.21
While the benefits of antipsychotic drug use are evident and quite
profound, the risks, though often overstated, are real.2" Antipsychotic
medication, for example, is similarly used to treat neurotic anxieties
and/or character disorders for which efficacy is yet to be established. 2
"
5HAYES & YUDOSKY, supra note 7, at 906.
' R. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 211,231 (2d ed. 1992).
"See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 441.
'
8APA Report Summarizes Recent Developments in Prevention and Trcatmcnt of Tardive
Dyslkinesia, 43 HosP. CoNMNrry PsYcmATRY 413 (1992) [hereinafterAPA Rcport].
"d.
'See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 457.
2 id. The reader should note that nearly thirty percent ($19 billion) of schizophrenia's cost
involves direct treatment and the rest is absorbed by other factors - lost time from work for
patients and care givers, social services and criminal justice resources. Schizophrenia affects one
percent of the population but accounts for a forth of all mental health costs and takes up one third
of the psychiatric beds. Since most schizophrenic patients are never able to work, they must be
supported for life by Medicaid and other forms of public assistance. The debilitating nature of the
illness brings enormous family and societal costs that often go unnoticed because they are not
reported to health insurers or mental health agencies. Id.
'See Smith & Simon, supra note 1, at 344.
'Id. The consensus of opinion in the literature asserts that antipsychotics -should vrtually
never be used with conditions such as character disorder or anxiety. The risk of TD is much
higher with such use and alternative treatments are much more successful. If the physician uses
antipsychotics for such conditions, he should carefully document his reasons. Id.
1997]
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Thus, when treating schizophrenic patients, the psychiatrist must assume
responsibility for both the risks and the benefits of antipsychotic
medication.24
This article discusses the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug
use, and the nexus between these drugs and TD. Having already discussed
the primary concerns involved with antipsychotic drug use in Part I of this
article, Part II establishes the requisite medical foundation upon which
antipsychotic drug use and TD exist. Combined with this medical
background, Part II explores TD risk factors, assessment techniques, and
drug treatment variables and strategies. Part III attempts to provide
insight into preventing TD malpractice claims. Specifically, Part III
focuses on clinician liability and the appropriate standard of care for
patients taking antipsychotic medication. Part IV analyzes various jury
verdicts and settlement agreements from TD malpractice claims
nationwide. Part V discusses the doctrine of informed consent and in
particular, seeks to define the requisite disclosure and patient consent
necessary for antipsychotic drug treatment. Part VI addresses the
controversial debate surrounding a patient's right to refuse treatment by
discussing three different approaches, the "rights-driven" approach, the
"treatment-driven" approach, and independent clinical review, and this
part of the article further considers how each of these approaches
uniquely impacts the right to refuse treatment debate.
The ultimate goal of this article is to demonstrate that a careful, well-
reasoned, and fully-informed risk-benefit analysis of TD can mitigate
tension amongst the medical, legal, and lay communities, thereby
improving the standard of patient care and reducing TD malpractice
claims. Also, the implementation of a risk-benefit analysis in the
administration of antipsychotic medication protects the clinician from the
undesirable consequences ofjudicial "judgment by hindsight," and leads
to consistent and factually supported judicial decisions that can be shared,
justified, and taught to everyone. 2
24See APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
"T. GUTHEIL ET AL., DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 58 (1991) [hereinafter
GUTHEIL]. This author seeks to address the needs and concerns of the medial, legal, and lay




In order to analyze the relationship between a clinician's decision to
administer antipsychotic drugs and the subsequent risk of developing TD,
the clinician must identify and examine a variety of factors which include:
(1) drug treatment variables;
(2) risk factors;
(3) methods and variables of assessment;
(4) methods of prevention; and
(5) advances in the treatment of TD.26
Since 1973, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has warned the
medical community of the causal connection between antipsychotic drug
use and TD; yet, the psychiatric community still under-recognizes this
disease2 7 Increased knowledge and understanding of the risk factors,
treatment, and even prevention of TID, will likely diminish the seriousness
and number of neuroleptic-induced TD cases. 8
General Background
The first reported case involving antipsychotic drug-induced TD occurred
in 1957, five years after the introduction of antipsychotic drugs.29
Following years of controversy and denial by the psychiatric community,
there is currently general agreement that antipsychotic drugs are a major
factor in the development of TI).3 However, not all involuntary
movements demonstrated by patients who take antipsychotic drugs
establish the presence of TD.3' In fact, spontaneous tick-like and
26See Latimer, Tardive Dyskinesia: A Review, 40 CAN. J. PSYcHIATRY 49 (Supp. 1995).
27See Hansen et al., Under recognition of Tardire Dyskinesia and Dng-Induced
Parkinsonism by Psychiatric Residents, 14 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 340 (1992); Kalachnik &
Sprague, How Well Do Physicians, Pharmacists, and Psychologists Assess Tardive Th'sincsia
Movements?, 2S ANN. PHAiMACOTHER. IS5 (1994). This under recognition is es-PeCially common
amongst psychiatric residents. Hansen et al., Under recognition of Tardire Dyskinesia and Dng-
Induced Parkinsonism by Psychiatric Residents, 14 GEN. HOsp. PSyCHIATRY 340 (1992),
'See Jeste & Caligiuri, Tardive Dskinesia, 19 ScHizoPHP. BULL 303 (1993).
29Id.30
,d.
3 Several neurologic disorders of the basal ganglia such as Huntington's disease, Wilson's
disease, brain neoplasm, Fahr's syndrome, Hallervorden-Spatz disease, and Sydenham's chorea
can also produce abnormal involuntary movements. Other identifiable movement disorders
include hyperthyroidism, hypoparathyroidism, torsion dystonia , Tourette's syndrome, Nieige
8031997]
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perseverative movements often identified with TD have been observed in
psychotic patients for many years prior to the introduction of antipsychotic
drugs.32
Spontaneous dyskinesias are poorly understood and difficult to study;
yet, they are substantially significant to the clinical and medicolegal
fields.33 An estimated 4 to 7 percent of the elderly population in the
United States develop dyskinesia in the absence of antipsychotic drugs,
and estimated prevalence rates of spontaneous dyskinesia among
schizophrenic patients have reached 30 percent.34 The issue of
spontaneous dyskinesia is important to the risk-benefit analysis for
prescribing antipsychotic drugs because this factor appears to weaken the
causal connection between dyskinesia and antipsychotic drug use.
The prevalence of TD is difficult to estimate, because incidence rates
vary depending on the nature and demographics of the study. 6 The
American Psychiatric Association (APA) has estimated the prevalence of
TD between 15 and 20 percent of patients using antipsychotic drugs. 7
Also, the incidence or proportion of any group that is initially free of TD
or that will develop symptoms of TI) pursuant to antipsychotic drug use
within a designated time period is also difficult to estimate. 38 Medical
studies also indicate that the incidence of TID increases as the length of
syndrome, and spasmodic torticollis. The distinction between tardive dyskinesia and these
disorders can be difficult to make, especially for the inexperienced observer. 'TD is a diagnosis
of exclusion and other possibilities should be excluded, especially if the history and medications
are unknown. Latimer, supra note 26, at 50.
32APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
"Latimer, supra note 26, at 50.
34Id. Data on spontaneous dyskinesia is hard to obtain and it is difficult to determine
whether an individual patient's abnormal movements are induced by antipsychotic medication or
have developed spontaneously. Therefore, it is likely that tardive dyskinesia's accepted prevalence
of 20 percent is inflated because researchers have not adjusted for spontaneous dyskinesia. Age
is a definite risk factor for spontaneous dyskinesia. After the age of forty the prevalence of
spontaneous dyskinesia is sufficiently high to conclude that many patients with diagnoses of
tardive dyskinesia have abnormal movements attributable to causes other than anipsychotics. For
an insightful discussion about spontaneous dyskinesia see Khot & Wyatt, Not All That Moves is
Tardive Dyskinesia, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 661 (1991); Fenton et a., Risk Factors for
Spontaneous Dyskinesia in Schizophrenia, 51 ARcH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 643 (1994).
"
5Latimer, supra note 26, at 50.361d.
37ApA Report, supra note 18, at 413.38Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 304 (studies of incidence are variable because of the
age of patients in the study, their psychiatric diagnosis, and the length of drug treatment).
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antipsychotic drug treatment increases.39 In one long-term study where
the median length of lifetime exposure to antipsychotic drugs was twelve
months, there was a 5 percent incidence level of TD after one year, 10
percent after two years, 15 percent after three years, 19 percent after four
years, and 26 percent after six years. 0
Preliminary studies tracking the course of TD indicated the disorder
was progressive and irreversible.41 Recent studies, however, indicate TD
is not progressive in most patients; instead, the individual's condition will
actually stabilize, and may even improve.42 A number of studies have also
documented the course and development of TD among patients who take
antipsychotic drugs, and, thereafter, exhibit symptoms of the disease.43
The majority of these studies indicate these patients either demonstrated
signs of improvement or showed no significant change in their current
condition." These findings are significant to both the medical and legal
fields, and should influence the clinician's decision on whether to
continue administering antipsychotic medication to a TD patient.S
Clearly, these figures do not support the proposition that a clinician should
discontinue antipsychotic medication if TD develops, especially since TD
symptoms diminish even with the continued use of medication!' In
addition, the risk-benefit analysis is further influenced in the case of
severely psychotic patients for whom discontinuing medication would
lead to a potentially catastrophic relapse.47
391d.
4
'LATBEER, supra note 26, at 51.
"KALAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2005.
421d.
43Id.
4id. In a 1994 study done by Gardos & Cole, a group of 122 neuroleptie-treated Hungarian
outpatients were assessed for TD over a ten year period. The overall prevalence of TD in this
group changed little over time; it wvas 30.2 percent at baseline, 36.5 p.rcent at five years, and 31.7
percent at ten years. Gardos et al., Ten-year Outcome of Tardive Dyskincsia, 151 Ai.. I.
PSYCHIATRY 836 (1994). In another study done in Italy, the course of TD outcomers was followed
up for three years in a population of 125 institutionalized patients receiving continuous
antipsychotic treatment. The prevalence of TD rose from 39.2 percent at the first examination to
52.8 percent at the last one. However, 2S.6 percent of TD affected patients recovered and 30
percent improved. This finding of no certain irreversibility confirms the Gardos study. Cavallaro
et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Outcomes: Clinical and Pharmacologic Correlates of Remission and
Persistence, 8 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 233 (1993).
4"See Gardos, supra note 44, at S40.
46 Id.
47SeeAPA Report, supra note 1, at 413.
1997]
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One study has suggested that rather than viewing TD as "a reversible
or irreversible condition, it may be more helpful to view it as being on a
continuum from resolution to persistence."4 The potentially serious
consequences of TD include both physical and psychosocial
complications, as well as the inherent complication of persistence.4 9 The
most common physical complications of oral dyskinesia include dental
and denture problems, muffled speech, and traumatic ulceration.SO
Swallowing disorders, on the other hand, are not commonly identified
with oropharyngeal dyskinesia.5 Respiratory disturbances accompanied
by reflexive grunting, snorting, gasping, and shortness of brgath have also
been reported,5 2 as have weight loss53 and a shorter life expectancy.
5 4
Finally, abnormal involuntary body movements that characterize TD may
also produce psychological problems such as depression; because such
movements often create a sense of stigma and anxiety for the patient.-'
Consequently, although TD is potentially disabling, severe forms of TD
are rare;5 6 it would be unusual for a clinician to refrain from administering
antipsychotic drugs for fear of these uncommon complications.57
Risk Factors
Clinical knowledge of the various TD risk factors is critical to determining
whether to administer antipsychotic medication. If the clinician provides
treatment to a high risk patient, he or she must monitor and guard against
burgeoning signs of TD.58 Also, the clinician should tailor the patient's
drug regimen in an effort to reduce and/or prevent TD.59
48Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 309.491d.50 d.
511d.521d.
S3ld.
S4See Mehta et al., Mortality of Patients with Tardive Dyskinesia, 135 AA. J. PSYCHIATRY
371 (1978). In this study nineteen dyskinetic patients had died after five years compared with
twelve patients in the control group. The results of this research are fairly controversial and other
researchers have not found associations between tardive dyskinesia and a shortened longevity. Id.
SSJeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 310.
S6Gardos & Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 776, 777 (1980).57Id.




The most implicated risk factor for TD, especially the more severe
and persistent forms, is increased age. 0 Many studies indicate there is a
strong correlation between a patient's age and the prevalence and severity
of TD.6' Therefore, clinicians must be extremely cautious when
administering antipsychotic drugs to elderly patients and any side effects
should be carefully monitored.62
A second major set of TD risk factors is age and gender. The
prevalence of severe TD among elderly woman is significantly higher than
among young women.63 A 1992 review from seventy-six selected studies
totaling 39,187 patients, revealed the prevalence of TD was significantly
higher among women at 26.6 percent than men at 21.6 percent.0 The
same survey also evaluated the prevalence of TD among patients from
various geographic locations and found TD was less common among
patients of Asian descent than patients of North American, European, and
African descent.65
Clinicians should also warn patients of the following risk factors
associated with TD: smoking, 66 alcohol use,6" and the use of anti-
depressants.6S Diabetes mellitus has similarly been identified as a possible
risk factor.69 Dyskinetic patients also demonstrate indirect evidence of
brain damage, such as a perinatal event or traumatic brain injury in
infancy or early childhood.70
Although TD is primarily associated with schizophrenic patients,
patients with primary affective disorders and schizoaffective disorders
LId. at 413.
61Smith & Baldessarini, Changes in Prevalence, Severi, and Rccorily in Tardive
Dyskinesia with Age, 37 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1368 (19S0) [hereinafter Smith].621d.
63APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
64Yassa & Jeste, Gender Differences in Tardive Dyskinesia: A Critical Review, of the
Literature, 18 SCHIZOPHR. BULL. 701 (1992).
651d.
6 Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 305.
6
'Duke et al., Alcohol Use and its Relationship to Symptoms, Tardive DLy inesia and lliness
Onset, 164 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 630 (1994).6
'Clayton, Antidepressant-induced Tardive Dyskinesia: Review, and Case Report, 31
PSYCHOPHARIACOL. BULL. 259 (1995).
6
'Woerner et al., Diabetes and Development of Tardive DysLincsia, 150 AM. J. PbYCHIATrY
966(1993).
7 Pourcher et al., Neuroleptic Associated Tardive Dyskinesias in Young People with
Psychoses, 166 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 768 (1995).
8071997]
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may even be at a higher risk when treated with neuroleptics.7' Other
studies have revealed that mood disorders, including major depression and
bipolar disorder, are also risk factors for neuroleptic induced TD.72
Nevertheless, in a 1992 report on TD, the APA decried the lack of
research directed toward TD risk factors, arguing that such research would
aid in the development of TD prevention.7 3
Assessing Tardive Dyskinesia
A careful and successful diagnosis, coupled with an ongoing clinical
assessment of TD symptoms, is crucial toward controlling the
development of TD symptoms: 4 Unfortunately, clinical assessments are
often complicated by various methodological problems, and the lack of
precise and reliable assessment methods.75 For example, voluntary
suppression, fluctuation of symptoms due to changes in arousal, posture,
mobility or medications, spontaneous increase or decrease of the
symptoms of the disorder, and differentiating the diagnosis from other
movement disorders all play a role in clinical assessment.76 The lack of
precise assessment methods may be one of the main factors leading to the
inability to adequately delineate the syndrome, determine prevalence, and
develop more effective treatment programs to improve these assessment
methods that have been utilized over the last fifteen years.77
The diagnostic criteria currently employed by clinicians to assess TD
include:
(1) a three month minimum of cumulative neuroleptic exposure;
(2) moderate abnormal involuntary movements in one or more body
areas, or mild movements in two or more body areas; and
(3) the absence of other conditions that produce involuntary hyperkinetic
dysldnesias. 8
71APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
7 Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 305.
73APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
7 Latimer, supra note 26, at 49.75 d.
761d.
'Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 307.7 Latimer, supra note 26, at 50.
[Vo1.1:799
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Following a diagnosis of TD, the clinician should initiate a quantitative
method of assessment.79
The APA has stressed the need for quantitative methods such as
multi-item scales to assess TDY° Currently, the most common multi-item
scale used to test for TD is the Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale
(AIMS)." Other scales include the Rockland Scale, the Extrapyramidal
Symptom Rating Scale (ESRS), and the Dyskinesia Identification System
Condensed User Scale (DISCUS). 82 The quality of scoring on rating
scales often depends on the experience of the observer,83 and a careful
clinician should monitor patients every three to six months to assess for
TD.84 A 1992 APA Report has also recommended that the clinician,
especially one who is inexperienced, consult with a specialist in those
cases difficult to assess.85
Instrumental assessments for TD first appeared in 1973.'6 These
assessments were designed to enhance clinical understanding of TD, and
to distinguish ITD from other movement disorders, thereby helping to treat
and prevent TD. 7 In addition, recent advances in computer technology
and increased sophistication of instrumental procedures over the past few
years have been promising.88 Researchers currently use accelerometers,
electromyography, force gauges, position transducers, Doppler ultrasound,
and digital image processing to detect and differentiate TD from other
disorders.8 9
791d.
"APA Report, supra note 18, at 413. The APA has indicated that scores on a rating scale
cannot be used to diagnose the patient's condition.81Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 30S. The AIMS test identifies seven areas of the body
and their most common abnormal movements and assesses each movement on a scale of 0 to 4.
The AIMS is a reliable rating for trained observers, but it does not distinguish bctwen TD and
other movement disorders. Id.
'See Kalachnik & Sprague, The Dyskinesia Identification System Condenscd User Scale
(DISCUS): Reliabiliy, Validity, and a Total Score Cut-offfor Mentally il and Mentally Retarded
Populations, 49 L CLIN. PSYCHOL. 177 (1993) (The psychometrically derived (DISCUS) cut-off
score of 5 or above is a "red flag" that clinicians may use in monitoring individuals prezcnbed
antipsychotic medication).
5 Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 308.
4APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
'Id.
'sJeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 308.
7Id.
3d.
9Id. at 308-309. See also Lohr & Caligiuri, Quantative Instrumental Measurement of
Tardive Dy'sldnesia: A Review, 6 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 231 (1992).
1997] 809
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Drug Treatment Variables
The efficacy of antipsychotic drugs to treat and prevent schizophrenia
relapse is well established. 90 Within a twelve-month period, clinical
studies have indicated on average 16 percent of neuroleptic patients
suffering from schizophrenia relapse, whereas 74 percent of patients who
do not receive neuroleptics relapse.91 However, there is still no consensus
on what constitutes an optimal dose of antipsychotic drugs for the
individual patient.92
The typical antipsychotic drugs used in treatment include: Thorazine,
Haldol, Prolixin, Mellaril, and Stelazine.9a One study has revealed that no
one antipsychotic drug is superior, and there is little data identifying
specific drugs or drug classes in the development of TD.94 Recent data,
however, indicates that several atypical antipsychotic drags result in
milder side effects and are equally efficacious in treating psychosis.95 The
APA has cited, for example, the potential of Clozapine in lowering the
risk of TD, but has also determined further research is needed in light of
other potential side effects.96  A second novel antipsychotic is
Risperidone. Although several times less potent than Haldol, Risperidone
parallels Haldol in controlling the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia.
97
90See APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
9 Shriqui, Neuroleptic Dosing and Neuroleptic Plasma Levels in Schizophrenia:
Determining the Optimal Regimen, 40 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 38 (Supp. 1995).
921d
.93Ihere are three major generic classes of antipsychotic agents: phenothiazines (chief brand
names are Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolazin and Stelazine); thioxanthenes (chief brand names Taracan
and Navane); and butyrophones (chief brand name Haldol).
'Kane & Smith, Tardive Dyskinesia: Prevalence and Risk Factors, 1959 to 1979, 39 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY473, 476 (1982). The most persuasive argument for prescribing any specific
drug is a patient's reaction record to the drug. See HAYES & YUDOSKY, supra note 7, at 906.
9SKAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2016.
96APA Report, supra note 18, at 413. Clozapine's most significant side effects include
agranulocytosis, seizures, weight gain, hypotension, and sedation. See Buchanan, Clozapinc:
Efficicacy and Safety, 21 SCIZOPHP. BULL. 579 (1995); Gerlach & Peacock, Motor and Mental
Side Effects of Clozapine, 55 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 107 (Supp. 1994). Clozapine',,; other benefits
include: effectiveness in 30 to 50 percent of treatment resistant psychotic patients, thus it is the
treatment of choice for severely disabling psychotic illness that has not responded to "standard"
antipsychotic. See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2016.
971d. at 2017. For an interesting discussion of the potential of risperidone see Keltner,
Risperidone: The Search for a BetterAntipsychotic, 31 PERsPECT. PSYCHIATRIC CPdtE 30 (1995).
The authors maintain the potential for risperidone as a first line antipsychotic because it is
arguably better than traditional antipsychotic in treating schizophrenia, but will not likely cause
extrapyramidal symptoms and has less severe and fewer side effects than clozapine. See also
Marder & Meibach, Risperidone in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 823
810 [Vol. 1:799
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To date, much research has focused on the design of new drugs to
treat psychosis without the possibility of causing dangerous side effects
such as TD.9" Studies have also been conducted on the optimal
antipsychotic drug dosage a clinician should administer, and the various
techniques used to administer these drugs.99 The results of such research
could potentially shift the risk-benefit ratio of antipsychotic drugs from a
moderate risk/high benefit to a low risk/high benefit."' Because the risk
of TD is greater in long-term treatment, acute (short-term) treatment must
be distinguished.01  While it is often imperative to administer
antipsychotic drugs in an acute situation, it is not always necessary to
administer these drugs on a long-term basis.102
Medical literature suggests that clinicians should administer the least
possible effective dose of antipsychotic drugs to a patient.
10 3
Unfortunately, it is often difficult for the clinician to determine the least
possible effective dose. 4 Significantly, the authors of a popular medical
textbook determined that there are no additional benefits received from the
use of high doses, and the greatest medical benefit is reached with "600
to 900 mg a day of Chlorpromazine, which is sufficient for most patients
and consistent with an average of 10 mg a day ofHaloperidol (Ialdol) and
upper limits of 12 to 20 mg a day."'05 A higher dose, nevertheless, is often
required for a patient who experiences severe psychosis and/or an
extremely high degree of agitation.06 However, the clinician must realize
that an antipsychotic drug which causes side effects in one patient may be
harmless to another. 0 7 In fact, a patient may have as much as a twenty-
fold variation in blood level after receiving the same antipsychotic
dosage!"S Over one-hundred clinical studies have attempted to delineate
the degree of correlation between dose, neuroleptic blood level, and
clinical response, but to date these studies have met with only moderate
(1994).
9KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2016.
9) Id.
""Id. at 2005.
... Davis et al., supra note 3, at 1 IS.
ia Id.
'
03APA Report, supra note IS, at 413.
"04See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2013.
1I5d.
"'HAYES & YUDOSKY, supra note 7, at 906.
I07d.
1i3KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2014.
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success. 1 9 Plasma level determination, however, is useful in recognizing
noncompliance and has guided the clinician toward distinguishing
between neuroleptic-induced behavioral toxicity and increased
psychosis."
0
The APA and standard psychiatric textbooks have published various
guidelines for initiating antipsychotic drug therapy."' Many psychiatrists
are pressured by staff members to control the patient's behavior and,
therefore, may increase the dosage or switch antipsychotic drugs
prematurely." 2  Pursuant to the patient's first psychotic episode,
antipsychotic drug treatment should continue for no less than one year."13
Five years of treatment is recommended once the patient has experienced
a second psychotic episode.14
There are several techniques used in antipsychotic drug maintenance
therapy. Many research scientists attempt to administer a lower dosage to
the patient through intermittent and targeted treatment in order to prevent
side effects, such as TD.1 5 Intermittent treatment involves a fixed
administration schedule incorporating medication-free days, whereas
targeted treatment limits the use of antipsychotic drugs to periods of
incipient relapse." 6 The efficacy of intermittent and targeted treatments
depends on patient monitoring, which in turn requires al ongoing and
well-established therapeutic relationship." 7
The APA task force on TD has determined that both intermittent and
targeted treatment are not viable forms of treatment for most patient
subgroups due to the threat of relapse." 8 A common strategy, according
to the APA, is continuous low dosage of oral antipsychotic, 2.5 mg per
day for oral haloperidol or fluphenazine, or depot dosage, 50 mg to 60 mg
every four weeks for haloperidol decanoate, or 6.5 to 12.5 mg every two
weeks for fluphenazine decanoate.'9
'"Shriqui, supra note 91, at 39.
"°Id. Note that it is often difficult to determine plasma level concentrations for the average
clinician (as opposed to research scientists) because of cost and time constraints. Id.
"'See HAYES & YUDoSKY, supra note 7, at 907.
"'KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2014.
i"d. at 2019.
14 d.




n gshriqui, supra note 9 1, at 44.
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Today, most clinicians reject the rampant megadosing that occurred
during the 1980's, prescribing lower doses of antipsychotic medication
instead."' Studies, however, indicate the current relapse rate for
schizophrenia is three times higher than average. 2' This increase may, in
effect, lead to and simultaneously lead to deterioration of the patient's
condition increased health care costs." The high relapse rate can be
attributed to the inadequate dosing that results from clinician and patient
noncompliance." Clinician noncompliance occurs when the clinician
fails to recommend prophylaxis, discontinues treatment too soon, and
overestimates the risk of complications such as TD. Therefore, the
clinician must properly assess the myriad of drug variables, guard against
relapse and side effects such as TD, and account for all potential risks in
determining whether to prescribe antipsychotic drugs.2 4
TD Treatment Strategies
The APA task force on TD recommends that once a patient's condition
worsens, antipsychotic drug use should either be discontinued or a new
drug tried,l2 since for many patients, the presence of TD does not alter the
clinician's decision to stop treatment, especially in light of the benefits
received.12 6 However, if the patient is only moderately in need of
antipsychotic drugs, the risk-benefit analysis might change and the
clinician may decide to stop treatment. 2 7  Further, a patient with
borderline indications for antipsychotic drugs should also receive short,
drug-free intervals as a method for unveiling latent TD. 3
Clinicians should become familiar with the benefits of antipsychotic
drug use and monitor for symptoms of TD at least once every three
months.12 9 Although TD poses a potential risk for the clinician, in most
cases TID is mild and requires no particular treatment other than a gradual





sSee APA Report, supra note IS, at 414.
'Davis et al., supra note 3, at 120.127M.
128Id
'29APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
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neuroleptic dose reduction. 130 Complete discontinuation o Iantipsychotic
drug use, however, is unwarranted since the potential isk of relapse
outweighs the benefit of preventing TD.131
Some patients who display TD symptoms need not discontinue
antipsychotic drug use entirely. 3 2  These patients should switch to
Clozapine or Risperidone because these drugs produce fewer side effects
than typical antipsychotic drugs.'33 Moreover, one study has indicated that
Clozapine and Risperidone may be therapeutically capable of reducing the
symptoms of TD.134 Additionally, other novel antipsychotic drugs which
offer fewer side effects are gradually being introduced into the United
States market.135
Notably, there is also a growing number of alternative methods of
treating TD. The APA task force on TD has indicated that vitamin E, 36
"Shriqui, supra note 91, at 45.
"Id. The reader should also be aware that when antipsychotic drugs are discontinued(especially precipitously) in patients who have been treated with the drugs for a year or more, there
is potential for a condition called withdrawal supersensitivity psychosis. If left untreated, the
psychotic symptoms will usually disappear in several weeks. Unfortunately, the clinician often
views this condition as the reemergence of the underlying psychosis and will tleat with additional
antipsychotic drugs. Restarting antipsychotic drugs with patients with withdrawal supersensitivity
psychosis will needlessly prolong the use of antipsychotic drugs and increase the threat of TD.
HAYES & YuDOsKY, supra note 7, at 915. Also, there are instances where continued antipsychotic
therapy is clinically necessary even if the patient has severe tardive dyskinesia. The patient may
even die without drug treatment. This situation usually occurs in the elderly who have risks of
respiratory failure. Id. at 914.
321d.
133Feltner & Hertzman, Progress in the Treatment of Tardive Dyskinesia: Theory and
Practice, 44 Hosp. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 25 (1993).
134There still needs to be more research in this very promising area and some authors
disagree with the potential of these drugs to treat TD (or at least question the rmethodology of the
studies that suggest clozapine and risperidone can treat TD). But for an examination of the
potential of these two drugs to treat TD, see Lieberman et al., The Effects of Clozapine on Tardive
Dyskinesia, 158 BL J. PSYCHIATRY 503 (1991).
"
5These novel antipsychotic drugs include serdolect and zotepine. Clinicians should
consider switching to these novel antipsychotics because of the significantly less threat of tardive
dyskinesia. Typical antipsychotics still constitute about 85 percent of the prescriptions written
for antipsychotic drugs. One problem is that many of these novel antipsychotics are very
expensive. But studies have shown that patients are more likely to stay on therapy and stay out
of the hospital by taking these novel drugs. This lessening of downstream costs could significantly
decrease the financial burden of schizophrenia. A greater educational effort is needed to convince
Medicaid officials, state legislators, and other policy makers to permit greater access to novel
antipsychotic drugs.
136APA Report, supra note 18, at 414. For an examination of Vitamin E treatment see Lohr
& Caligiuri, A Double-Blind Placebo-controlled Study of Vitamin E Treatment of Tardive
Dyskinesia, 57 J. CLiN. PsYCHIATRY 167 (1996); Elkashef et al., Vitamin E in the Treatment of
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ceruletide,'37 and ganmma-linolenic acid133 may effectively treat TD. 139
Pharmacological agents that have received mixed results, yet may
nonetheless effectively treat TD include: propranol, clonidine, baclofen,
sodium valproate, benzodiazapines, bromocriptine, levodopa, amantadine,
verapamil, diltiazem, nifedipine, pindolol, lecithin, naloxone, and
isosorbide dinitrate.' 4' The use of adjunctive therapies with neuroleptics
is not risk-free, and therefore, a risk-benefit analysis that considers the





Medication-related injuries accounted for 20 percent of the total claims
against psychiatrists during the 1980's. 142 A substantial number of these
claims involved the use of antipsychotic medication. 143 According to one
commentator, "there is an enormous backlog of cases that is going to
plague us for years,"'144 and as such, "the impending flood of [TD]
litigation has begun."'145 To date, however, there have been relatively few
reported TD-related lawsuits. 1
46
There are a number of possible reasons why litigation surrounding
TD is relatively uncommon. First, chronically ill patients with TD might
Tardive Dyskinesia, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 505 (1990).
"'Kojima et al., Treatment of Tardive Dyslknesia ivith Ceruclide: A Doublk.blind, Placcbo-
controlled Study, 43 PSYCHIATRY RES. 129 (1992).
13Feltner, supra note 133, at 30.
1391d.
14 HAYIFS & YUDOSKY, supra note 7, at 914-15.
1411d.
142R. SImioN & I. SADOFF, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: CASES AND CO..le.Ts FOR
CLINICIANS 106 (1992) [hereinafter SION & SADOFF].
143Id
'4Baker, Expect a Flood of Tardive Dyskinesia Malpractice Suits, ClAN. PSYCHIATrY NEWS
(1984), quoted in Appelbaum et al., Responsibility, and Compensation for Tardive Dyinesia, 142
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 806 (1985).
14'Baker, supra note 144, at 806.14 SIlON, supra note 16, at 230. As of 1990, Simon's research revealed less than thirty
cases (including settlements and unpublished cases) dealing with tardive dyskinesia. The author
will cite many of the cases and settlements occurring since 1990 in the next section of the article.
The number of cases dealing with TD malpractice after 1990 number less than twenty-five. Many
of the recent cases deal with the issue of "right to refuse treatment" and legal defenses like the
statute of limitations. Not all of the cases dealing with "right to refuse" or the statute of limitations
will be cited. Id.
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not recognize the opportunity for legal recourse.'47 A relatively high
number of severely psychotic patients maintain limited family contacts, 148
and many of these patients are unable to identify the causal connection
between their condition and antipsychotic drug use due to factors such as
age, type of disability, and lack of information from the clinician."n' In
addition, many of thege patients do not wish to publicize their psychiatric
condition, and therefore, are reluctant to pursue a claim for fear of public
recognition.15
Causation is another reason why there have been so few TD-related
lawsuits reported.' Failure to document the time and place a patient
develops TD is not uncommon, especially since a schizophrenic patient
often receives treatment from numerous physicians and mental health
workers at different psychiatric facilities. 5 Therefore, to establish a
primafacie case against a clinician or health care facility, the patient must
eliminate the causal connection between TD and other toxic, infectious,
neurological, and pre-existing movement disorders."3
The latent appearance of TD may further hinder the patient's ability
to seek legal recourse. 5 4  The statute of limitations for malpractice
claims, coupled with inevitable discovery rules often bar such claims at
the pleading stage.'55 While it may be true that the majority of TD cases
demonstrate no signs of malpractice, many prominent psychiatrists believe
TD is a condition that appears with regularity. 5 6 The avoidable TD cases
are discouraging to research scientists, especially in light of FDA
warnings and guidelines established by the 1992 APA Report on TD. 157






138SIMON, supra note 16, at 218.
154 Id.
... There are approximately ten cases on record that went for the defense because of the
plaintiff's failure to satisfy the statute of limitations.56 SIMON, supra note 16, at 226 (citing Jeste & Wyatt, Therapeutic Strategies Against
Tardive Dyskinesia, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 803 (1982)).
157Id.
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A recent 1994 survey indicated that TD continues to stir reactions
from both clinicians and clinical administrators." 3 The survey revealed
the "denial of [TD], plus the great fear [of] making its risk known, will
drive patients offtheir needed medication [and therefore] clearly continues
to get in the way of establishing more rational practice.""' Studies
pertaining to the underrecognition of TD also indicate that physicians at
all levels lack concern for TD." Consequently, TD experts emphasize the
need to continue educating clinicians and other mental health
professionals about the prevention of TD.161
To minimize the occurrence of TD malpractice and alleviate the
present "extreme reaction" among clinicians, the entire mental health
community must be properly informed as to the nature, benefits, and use
of antipsychotic drugs. 162  Education must be directed toward
psychiatrists, general practitioners, social workers, psychologists,
rehabilitation counselors, nurses, and administrators. The reason for this
is simple: mental health facilities currently lack properly trained staff
members capable of administering and supervising antipsychotic drug use
and assessing TD.163 The mental health community must develop
ISSBenjamin & Munetz, CMHC Practices Related to Tardiva Dyslf ncsia Screening and
Informed Consent for Neuroleptic Drugs, 45 Hosp. COM..UNTPI PSYCHIATRY 343,346 (1994).
1591d.
16Hansen et al., supra note 27, at 342.
161id. The author of this article realizes it is not the role of the attorney to give medical
advice to the clinician. This article has several functions. First, it attempts to correct many of the
factual inaccuracies that many attorneys and judges have concerning TD and antipsychotic drugs.
The author believes it is important for an attorney, especially ajudge, to understand the medical
nuances of TD and antipsychotics because most do not have access to recent medical literature.
Most lawyers read legal journals and court cases with inaccurate medical information because the
authors of these articles fail to cite recent and accepted medical authority (usually no medical
authority is cited). Second, this article may be useful to the social worker, the psycholo,gist, or the
nurse who often has to assess patients taking antipsychotic drugs. Third, the article may be useful
for the general physician or the general psychiatrist not in an university setting who must
administer antipsychotics but may not be expert in their use. Fourth, this article is an attempt to
minimize TD litigation by suggesting several medicolegal solutions and commenting on various
potential regulatory solutions. This function is the more traditional one for the attorney and is
certainly an appropriate topic for both the legal and medical communities. Although the author
concedes many in the medical community wonder if "solutions" coming from an attorney do more
harm than good. This article will hopefully do more good as it 'valiantly" attempts to be sensitive
to the concerns of the medical community and attempts to be factually accurate vith respect to
the medical literature.
"H6 -opefully, this article will alleviate some of the fear in the mental health community
regarding TD by explaining the dearth of TD lawsuits and the difficulty of winning a case.
"See Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 344.
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continuing medical education programs that specifically address TD.
Furthermore, since studies suggest that live lectures are an ineffective
method of altering clinician prescription habits,' 64 videotapes, journal
articles, and symposiums may ultimately be more effective.165
Clinician Liability
Clinician liability for the development of TD is based largely upon the
following acts or omissions: 16
6
(1) administering dosages of antipsychotic medication for improper
reasons, and/or for improper time periods;
(2) negligent diagnoses which may result in the wrong prescription of
antipsychotic medication;
(3) failure to monitor the patient's condition;
(4) negligent treatment of TD;
(5) failure to reduce or discontinue medication;
(6) polypharmacy, or the dangerous combination of multiple drugs;
(7) failure to seek expert consultation;
(8) failure to learn a patient's medical history;
(9) failure to incorporate risk factors such as age and gender; and
10) failure to obtain informed consent prior to administering antipsychotic
medication.1 67
Notably, the essential function of tort law is to provide a legal
remedy for a civil wrong. 68  Negligence principals and methods of
recovery likewise provide incentive for people and entities to act in a
careful and conscious manner in order to avoid civil liability. 69 While
many clinicians carefully administer antipsychotic drugs in an effort to
'"Gardos & Cole, supra note 56, at 780.
' 
6 d. See infra for a more explicit discussion of specific solutions like monitoring and other
regulatory proposals.
"The following examples of negligent conduct were taken from the author's analysis of
the TD case law. For further references to examples of negligence see SIMON & SADOFF, supra
note 142, at 106; Wettstein, Tardive Dyskinesia and Malpractice, 1 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND
THELAW 85, 89(1983).
67The author will give an in-depth analysis of the issue of informed consent and the
litigation that surrounds informed consent in a subsequent section of this article.
"'
68Wettstein & Appelbaum, Legal Liability for Tardive Dyskinesia, 35 HosPITAL AND
CoMN ,NrTY PSYCHIATRY 992,993 (1984).69Id.
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prevent TD, 170 prolonged treatment from numerous physicians and
institutions tends to minimize the physician's ability to familiarize herself
with the patient's medical history, thereby diminishing the overall quality
of treatment."' Because physicians and institutions are often threatened
with malpractice claims resulting from their failure to adequately care for
and monitor these patients,'" both groups must consciously defend
themselves from allegations of improper delegation of authority,
substandard supervision, inadequate training procedures for staff
members, and failure to establish appropriate clinician-patient contact."3
One reason for the physician's fear of malpractice is the "belegaling"
of medicine or the perceived legal intrusion into the medical field. 4
Many physicians become frustrated and subsequently experience a lack of
autonomy from the need to adhere to strict defensive medicine, where the
primary aim is self-protection from liability in the event of a bad outcome,
rather than seeking to ensure the well-being of the patient. 7 This attitude
creates an adversarial relationship between the physician and patient,
which may ultimately result in poor treatment decisions and increased
health care costs.176 The legal system today must give more deference to
the combined professional judgment, competence, and ethics of those in
the medical field.1" In Youngberg v. Romeo,7 8  the United States
Supreme Court declared that significant heed must be paid to the
judgments of qualified professionals in determining when reasonable care
has been given.17 9 Therefore, lower courts must never lose sight that the
7
°Id. Many clinicians give inadequate dosages because of the threat of TD litigation. The
result of this "defensive practice of medicine" is potential relapse and paradoxically an increaccd




'75GtHEmI, supra note 23, at 211.
"Defensive medicine nationwide is costing an additional $15 billion annually, an amount
translating to $1.19 per week for every American. GuTHEL, supra note 25, at 211. Practitioners,
the public, and third party insurers all experience the same impact on the price of medical care in
the form of additional and possibly unnecessary testing. Fear among physicians and
administrators has contributed to a different kind of cost expressed in the unavailability of services
in sectors of high-risk exposure. Id.
1
"Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 437.
17"457 U.S. 307 (1982).
'17-d. at 322-23.
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clinician is in the best position to determine the appropriate course of
treatment for the patient." 0
The Standard of Care
In malpractice litigation generally, the applicable standard of care can be
established by: authoritative treatises such as the Physician's Desk
Reference, government regulations and institutional guidelines, expert
witness testimony, and studies like the APA 1992 report on TD.18' With
respect to TD, the APA guidelines contain several unknowns and
qualifiers. For example, the directive that patients on antipsychotic drugs
be carefully monitored for TD would probably be given great weight in
establishing the applicable standard of care. However, it: is yet to be
determined whether a physician would be deemed negligent if he failed to
administer vitamin E in an attempt to treat TD, failed to utilize the most
advanced technology in assessing the patient for TD, and/or administered
antipsychotic drugs to treat a condition for which they are not required.
Conversely, a violation of government regulations and/or institutional
guidelines may serve as primafacie evidence of negligence despite the
various existing standards of care for TD.'
Because there is a degree of uncertainty involved with treating TD,
not one, but several possible standards of care are available.'83 Despite
this ambiguity, clinicians, like other specialists, are presently being held
to a high standard of care entailing that of a "reasonable specialist,"
irrespective of community standards.'84
There are many reasonable people in the legal profession who may
question the need or wisdom of giving deference to the judgment of the
medical professional. Most plaintiffs' attorneys view themselves as
defenders of patients wronged by those whom they trusted, and may cast
a wary eye at the medical profession. But it is not reasonable to hold an
anti-medicine mentality which serves to exacerbate tension between both
'
8 SIMON, supra note 16, at 108. The physician is also in the best position to personally
familiarize himself with the patient's condition and medical history. Id. Also, it is often difficult
for courts to determine the appropriate standard of care and to distinguish bad results from
unacceptable behavior because of the variability of practicing patterns. See Wettstein, supra note
168, at 89.
'"Id. at 90.





communities, and which will ultimately harm the patient. An example of
anti-medicine mentality is that of one legal academic who said,
"antipsychotic drugs inflict physical and mental harms on a broad scale -
a scale perhaps unprecedented in modem law."'"5 This anti-psychiatry and
anti-medication attitude among many in both the legal profession and
society has increased the potential for psychiatric litigation.5 6
Legal literature also indicates a propensity to emphasize the risks of
antipsychotic medication, while downplaying its profound benefits."
Unfortunately, the majority of legal literature dealing with antipsychotic
drugs is not only biased but also factually incorrectY ' The inaccuracies
in legal literature often taint the opinions of judges who rely on law
review articles. For example, the judge in Rennie v. Klein opined that
antipsychotic drugs may cause cancer, although this is, in fact, untrue."s
Another example of an inaccuracy becoming an established legal fact can
be found in In re the Mental Conmitient of M.P, where the Indiana
Supreme Court asserted that the risk of contracting TD for people taking
antipsychotic drugs is 50 percent.' One year later, an Illinois Court of
" Gelnan, Mental Hospital Drugging- Atonistic and Structural Remcdies, 32 CLE,. ST.
L. REV. 221,223 (193). Mr. Gelman was the plaintiff's-patient trial and appellate counsel in the
infamous right-to-refuse case of Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). Mr. Gelman and
the other attorneys who worked on the Rennie case should be commended for working to change
the grossly negligent environment in the New Jersey state mental hospital system in the 1970's.
The psychiatric community in thel970's was slow to acknowledge the threat of TD. This lack of
acknowledgment slowed research, hurt the credibility of the profession, and hurt the patients in
these hospitals. But it is dangerous and counterproductive to extrapolate from one grosoly
negligent situation in the 1970's to the practice of psychiatry today. Such cases today do not
support normal institutional psychiatry. One extremely important function of the first part of this
article was to show the profound benefits of antipsychotic medicine. Essentially, one could
colorfully assert that antipsychotic medicine provided benefits "Unprecedented in modem"
psychiatry. Id
"'See Davis et al., supra note 3, at 121.
£SBrakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 436.
"Id. Professor Brakel and Dr. Davis explain in their article that factual inaccuracies occur
in legal literature because articles "rely almost exclusively on one another, they merely repeat
spurious myths, piling misinformation on top of misinformation." Id. at 437. The authors further
explain that the original medical information in these law reviews is often inaccurate and
misleading. Most legal commentators did not read the original information or could not
completely understand the significance of what they read. Another problem is simply the lack of
medical articles and textbooks available to most lawyers. Id.
s'Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (N.J. 1979).
"
31d. at 646.
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Appeals cited this case and asserted this inaccurate information.19' The
factual errors in these cases are profound and have more than theoretical
consequences. The legal principles stemming from these cases may harm
the individual patients affected by the ruling, as well as all patients and the
mental health professionals who treat them. Also, such errors can
adversely influence a clinician's decisional analysis if the physician feels
compelled to accept judicial risk perception and not the actual risks
involved. Psychiatrists need to use clinical rather than legal criteria in
making treatment decisions.
This divergent perception of the risks involved in the treatment of
antipsychotic medication is yet another reason for the perceived medical
malpractice crisis and the tensions between the medical and legal
communities. 9 2 Thus, judges may tend to view clinicians' treatment
decisions as reckless.'93 The differences in risk perception are magnified
by "hindsight bias," as judges in malpractice suits seek outcomes
inevitable in retrospect. 9 4 Judges become more risk adverse because they
address treatment decisions retrospectively, while psychiatrists must make
treatment decisions prospectively.19 Judges also become more risk
adverse because the side effects of antipsychotic medication are visible in
a courtroom, while the benefits of antipsychotic medication are not readily
apparent.
The anti-medicine rhetoric often found in legal literature, and the
judicial misunderstanding of those medical facts involved in antipsychotic
medication and tardive dyskinesia, must be altered. The legal community
should be educated on the real risks of antipsychotic medication and TD
and must also be informed of the great benefits provided by such
"'
911n re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 74 (1988). The accepted prevalence rate forT'ID is between 10
percent and 20 percent. The incidence of TD is approximately 4 percent per year.
'
92Bursztajn et al., Medical and Judicial Perceptions of the Risks Associated with Use of
Antipsychotic Medication, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCIIATRY LAW 271, 271 (1991). In this study
psychiatrists and judges agreed about the probability of TD they would tolerate in order to prevent
the recurrence of relapse (50 percent). But the groups diverged in the estimation of the actual
probability of TD associated with the continued use of medication. The judges estimated the
medication carried a 62.5 percent probability of TD, while the psychiatrists estimated a 25 percent
probability of TD. Id. at 273. The data indicates that the decision analysis of the two groups differ
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medication. Judges and juries can learn through expert witnesses the true
medical facts in order to make reasoned decisions, and the medical
community should approach the problem of TD honestly in order to
develop an educational dialogue between the two professions. The
communities must be aware of each of the profession's inherent
differences, but also acknowledge the communities' real similarities.
96
Although there are profound uncertainties in medical decision
analysis, individual and institutional negligence does occur in the
administration of antipsychotic medication. An especially controversial
issue surrounds the administration of antipsychotic medication to both the
mentally retarded and the elderly in nursing homes. Clites v Iowat"7 is the
seminal case involving the negligent administration of antipsychotic drugs
to a mentally retarded individual. The plaintiff, Timothy, in Clites was a
patient at the Glenwood Hospital-School, a large residential facility for the
"
5 One of the most significant differences between the two professions is the tolerance for
ambiguity and the manner in which it is handled. Clinicians will ahways question the ethics of
attorneys as long as the adversarial process continues to ignore the uncertainties of the medical
decision process. A function of this article is to cause attorneys to be more cognizant of the
uncertainties of antipsychotic treatment. But the legal profession is nghtly frustrated by the
medical profession's assertion that they are the more moral and ethical of the profesions.
Lawyers, in the eyes of most physicians, are at most amoral. The author has been questioned by
several in the medical profession regarding any lawyer's competence in ethical issues. The legal
profession allegedly makes all its decisions from some large and secret code (maybe in Louisiana)
without any moral or ethical perspective. The author completely rewrTote ve ral decisions as a
clerk because the decision, although supported by case analysis, was simply not "ethical"
according to thejudge. Manyjudicial decisions are not "cut and dried" and the answers cannot
often be picked out of some code. There are often two or three almost equally valid decisions- the
very definition of an ethical dilemma. Although the author may be venturing into complex and
controversial jurisprudential waters, judicial decisions are often based on one's own personal
ethical code. Ethical analysis is part and parcel of the average attorney's everyday life. The legal
profession is wrong in indicting the mental health system for one or two bad cases; but the medical
professional is also wrong in indicting the entire legal profession for several bad experiences.
Several commentators have attempted to distinguish the professions by illustrating that the
law is grounded in a deontological perspective while the medical profession is grounded in a
telelogical perspective. But the law, as illustrated above, is focused not just on rules and
procedures, but often acts teleologically as it strives to help each individual reach their highest
level of attainment. The medical and legal profession must acknowledge their similarities. Both
professions have a high duty to their client or patient, both seek the truth and the attainment of
the highest virtue-justice, and both are concerned about healing (medicine's goal is the hcaling
of the patient's body and the legal profession is concerned about healing the nifts between
individuals and healing the "ills" in society).
1 7Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917 (1982). This case will be explored in detail in the next
two sections.
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mentally retarded, operated by the State of Iowa198 Approxihately seven
years after Timothy's admission to the hospital, his treating physicians
modified his treatment program.' 99 Timothy was prescribed major
tranquilizers to curb aggressive behavior, and between 1970-1975, he
received a "myriad of different tranquilizers, administered in various
combinations, under the auspices of several different physicians." 200 In
1975, Timothy was diagnosed as suffering from TD, and thereafter filed
a negligence action against the hospital. Timothy was ultimately awarded
$385,165 in future medical expenses, and $375,000 in past and future pain
and suffering.2
01
In response to the Clites decision, many commentators have
promoted the conservative use of antipsychotic drugs with mentally
retarded individuals. 20 2  In the mid-1980s, studies revealed that
approximately 40 percent of the mentally retarded population received
antipsychotic medication, whereas recent studies indicate a significant
decrease in antipsychotic drug use among these individuals.20 3  This
decrease may be the result of an effort to selectively administer
antipsychotic drugs to mentally retarded individuals experiencing
psychotic problems, and to avoid administering drugs to those individuals
merely demonstrating aggressive behavior.2 4
The improper administration of antipsychotic drugs to the mentally
retarded and elderly is troublesome, given the deteriorated physical and/or
mental condition of these individuals. A 1980 study revealed that 43
percent of patients in Tennessee nursing homes received antipsychotic
medication.0 5 The excessive use of antipsychotic medication in nursing
1gsClites, 322 N.W.2d at 918. Since early childhood, the plaintiff had been diagnosed as
mentally retarded due to an unknown prenatal cause. Id.
'"Clites, 322 N.W.2d at 918.
20DId.
20 Id. at 919.
2
'2See Gualtieri et al., Tardive Dyskinesia in Mentally Retarded Children, Adolescents, and
Young Adults: North Carolina and Michigan Studies, 18 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 62,64
(1982).2
°
3Intagliata & Rinck, Psychoactive Drug Use in Public and Community Residential
Facilities for Mentally Retarded Persons, 21 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 268-77 (1985).
204Id.
2
°SGoode, Antipsychotic Drugs: Regulating Their Use in the Private Practicc of Mcdicine,
15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 331,338 (1985) (citing Ray et al.,A Study ofAntip',ychoticDng Use




homes often occurs because physician-patient contact is limited,
medication is overused, and staff turnover is frequent.20' Limited
physician-patient contact often requires the delegation of duties to
inexperienced nursing staff, which in turn, leads to confusion over dosage
levels, telephone errors, and the continuation of medication beyond its
clinical usefulness.20 7 Also, given their lack of psychiatric training in the
nursing home, staff members might administer antipsychotic drugs solely
to cairn the patient, rather than to treat the underlying illness.2 c3
While education is paramount to the prevention of TD, certain
regulatory schemes may also prove valuable.2° Some states require
clinicians and staff members to undergo extensive training in the
administration of antipsychotic medication.2"' Such regulations may be
useful in preventing TD, without limiting the autonomy of the medical
profession.
The implementation of physician-patient contact requirements is
another area where statutory regulations maybe effective.2 " To illustrate,
states could simultaneously require physicians to review a patient's
medical history prior to administering a new drug prescription, and to
interview patients who take antipsychotic drugs every three to six months
per APA guidelines.212 Mandates governing physician-patient contact
may be the most helpful in the context of a nursing home or mental
"CSGoode, supra note 205, at 340.
..
7Id. (citing Dyer et al., Geriatrics & Gerontology-The Role of the Pharmacist in a
Geriatric Nursing Home: A Literature Review, 18 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHAwliAcY
428 (P. Lamy ed., 1984)).2031d.
"M'There are commentators who question the efficacy of educational efforts for the medical
community. See Gelman, supra note 193, at 234-240. The essence of this argument is that the
cause of TD is not lack of knowledge or carelessness, but the refusal to even acknowledge there
is a problem. Consequently, the use of education as a remedy will not solve the problem.
Although it may be true that some in the mental health community have difficulty acknowledging
the problem of TD, it is through education that these people will understand the realitie3 of TD and
the minimal malpractice risk they face if their decisions are informed and documented. Id.
21
°Jacqueline Guidry, J.D. et al., Persons With Developmental Disabilities and Tardive
Dyskinesia: A Historical Perspective and an Examination of State Policies Responding to
Litigation Questions, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAw 625, 646 (1988). The federal government also has
entered the picture and has allocated large sums of money (via DHEW) toward training programs
for pharmacists Who could perform clinically-oriented services and promote the rational clinical
use of drugs. Goode, supra note 205, at 341.
"'Guidry et al., supra note 210, at 647.
2 21d. at 647-49.
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institution, since these entities traditionally offer limited physician-patient
contact.21 3
While the benefits of state implemented regulatory schemes are
profound, there are also some controversial regulations. One such
regulation is the Jamison-Farabee consent decree, which requires external
review of clinical treatment within three days of antipsychotic drug
administration.214 Regulations like California's quality assurance system
and the Jamison-Farabee consent decree have been arguably successful,
but they do have setbacks. These mandates often waste clinical resources
because the review procedures are expensive and treatment methods are
rarely overridden. Moreover, the patient's condition may worsen during
treatment review.216 Finally, passive or timid physicians may blindly
conform to all guidelines, thereby denying the patient the right to
individualized treatment .z17
One promising area in the prevention of TD involves TD screening
and assessment programs. Enhanced methods of instruction and specific
clinical examinations should improve TD recognition rates. 2 Studies
suggest that without formal training, even TD assessments from
pharmacists, physicians, and psychologists may be inaccurate.2 9 Data
also suggests that neither professional group should perform TD screening
to the exclusion of the other,2 ' especially since a wide range of properly
trained medical professionals can accurately screen for TD, although the
assessment should be reviewed by a physician.221 Pharmacists and nurses,




'SSee Hargraves et al., Effects of the Jamison-Farabee Consent Decree.- Due Process
Protection for Involuntary Psychiatric Patients Treated with Psychoactive Drugs, 144 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 188 (1987).216See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 455. See also Hargraves, supra note 222, at 188.217See Laska et al., Automated Review System for Orders of Psychotropic Dnrgs, 37 ARCH.





physicians are often burdened by a myriad of numerous administrative and
cost-containment duties.m2
Regulations requiring TD screening in state hospitals may aid in
preventing TD and minimize the likelihood of medical malpractice. A
1986 survey revealed that 61 percent of states required some form of TD
assessment for institutionalized patients, but only 18 percent maintained
TD assessment policies for individuals residing in community
placement. m A 1994 study indicated that 41.3 percent of community
placement facilities maintained TD screening policies, but the majority of
clinical directors at these facilities stated that TD screening was
uncommon. 4 Regrettably, state regulations may have little effect on the
actual screening of patients for TD. As one study revealed, only 11.5
percent of psychiatrists affiliated with public hospitals were aware of state
regulations on TD risk disclosure.2 The discouraging results of these
studies may be somewhat alleviated, given that 10 percent of hospitals
have instituted or altered their TD screening policies since the Benjamin
and Munetz survey. 26 Therefore, physicians must never lose sight of the
fact that such policies exist as a means to protect both the physician and
patient from the negative implications of TD. 7 One method potentially
capable of shielding physicians from malpractice liability is the
documentation of treatment decisions. One commentator has even
declared that documentation of clinical reasoning is the "first
commandment of due care." 228  Documentation is necessary to
demonstrate awareness of clinical uncertainty and the effort taken to
'Id. For example, a nurse can conduct a TD assessment and forward the results to a
pharmacist if the DISCUS score is over 5. The pharmacist can then review the as-es--rment in terms
of drug treatment variables and can forward the assessment to a physician if the case needs more
formal diagnostic evaluations. This model may be especially useful in a nursing home or large
state mental hospital where physician contact is limited. The reader should note that non-
physician assessment is still controversial to some commentators. The use of social workers, case
managers or rehabilitation counselors is especially controversial. Id.
"'Guidry et al., supra note 210, at 644.
2'4Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 346 (noting systematic TD assessment is also
now being emphasized through HCFA guidelines).
'Kennedy & Sanborn, Disclosure of Tardive Dyskinesia: ETcts of Written Policies about
Tardive Dyskinesia, 28 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 93-100 (1992).
'26Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 346.
27State or hospital screening policies are also pointless if medical personnel are not
adequately trained to give the assessments.
'mGUtrEIL ET AL., supra note 25, at 56.
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confront such uncertainty.2 9 The physician should, therefore, document
his method of reasoning as a means to demonstrate the reasonableness of
the treatment and that the anticipated benefits of the treatment outweigh
the potential harm.230 Also, without documentation, the clinician is
defenseless to judicial hindsight.231 Finally, proper consultation with
colleagues is the "second commandment" of due care.232  While
knowledge gained from consultation is beneficial to the patient, it may
also reduce TD liability.
2 33
Societal recognition and understanding of mental illness is a
significant yet indirect method of preventing TD. The public must realize
that psychosis is not a sign of weakness, but a devastating disease.
Knowledge gained by employers, family members, and friends will
undoubtedly aid the schizophrenic's return to society. Also, lobbyists
must urge the government and third-party insurance companies to
reimburse medical costs while continuing to fund mental illness research.
Improved methods of drug and psychosocial treatment for psychotic
patients will hopefully prevent relapse and reduce harmful side effects like
TD. In addition, there must be societal pressure to fund staff increases and
other improvements in large state mental institutions and nursing homes.
These changes demand that the medical, legal, and lay communities
collaborate in their effort to effectively treat the psychotic patient and
prevent TD.
CASE ANALYSIS
Despite the fact that relatively few TD claims ever survive the pleadings
stage, 34 clinicians and institutions must nevertheless familiarize
themselves with the appropriate standard of care. Therefore, attention
must be directed toward those TD claims that have actually survived the
pleadings stage, for these cases offer evidence of the requisite standard of






"There are more TD cases that have been settled, that involved "right t.o refuse" treatment,
and were dismissed because of legal defenses like the statute of limitations. But the author still
could only locate approximately 50 cases involving tardive dyskinesia.
[Vo1.1:799828
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The Iowa Court of Appeals decision in Clites v. Iowas provides
valuable insight into litigation surrounding antipsychotic drug treatment
and TD. Faced with the issue of whether high doses of antipsychotic
drugs were necessary to curb the patient's aggressive behavior, the court
determined the doses were clearly disproportionate to the patient's level
of aggression.2 6 In support of its decision, the court found the hospital
failed to closely monitor the patient for TD, and failed to conduct a
physical examination of the patient for three years.27 In addition, the
hospital neither addressed the patient's burgeoning signs of TD, nor
altered its treatment program until four years after the patient first showed
symptoms of TD 38 Finally, the court noted that the attending physicians
never consulted with specialists to formulate a safe and effective treatment
plan for the patient.239 Based on these facts, the court concluded the
hospital was negligent in caring for the patient and upheld a S760,165
judgment against the hospital.240
Of mutual importance in Clites, was the lack of control the hospital
maintained over its own staff and drug treatment policies. Because the
hospital was severely understaffed, Timothy frequently received
antipsychotic medication from non-psychiatrists who were unfamiliar with
'D.2 41 Clites, therefore, is a classic example of a hospital's negligent care
and treatment of a patient receiving antipsychotic drugs.
The Clites court also reached several more dubious conclusions that
emphasized why the legal community needs to be educated in
antipsychotic drug treatment and TD. First, the Clites court concluded
that the practice of polypharmacy, the concurrent use of multiple drugs,
impeded the TD detection process and increased the likelihood of adverse
reactions.242 Second, the court considered the clinicians negligent for not
providing a "drug holiday."2 43 Third, the court concluded the physicians
at Glenwood negligently administered antiparkinsonian agents which
2-322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (The appellate court upheld all findings of the trial
court including the application of the correct standard of care and the amount of dam3ge3).




9Id. The author will discuss the issue of informed consent in Clitcs in the next section.
24
'Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917,920 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).2411d
242Id.2431d.
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suppressed the TD.244 Here, the error in the court's argument was that the
use of more than one drug is often warranted for treatment of TD,
including antiparkinsonian agents, to alleviate severe continuous
extrapyramidal symptoms.2 45 Further, the use of two antipsychotic drugs
has no greater effect than a higher dosage of one drug alone.246 Moreover,
the court's stipulation of the necessity of "drug holidays," or intermittent
treatment, is also controversial. In 1992, the APA stated intermittent
therapy is not a viable treatment option for most patients.247
Finally, the court in Clites also stated that the use of antipsychotic
drugs was designed as a convenience rather than a therapeutic program. 8
Much legal commentary contains misleading information like the "fact"
that psychiatrists mainly prescribe antipsychotic medication for their own
convenience.249 Consequently, Clites teaches physicians that they must
document that antipsychotic drugs are being used for therapeutic purposes
and not for the convenience of the medical staff.
250
The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in
Faigenbaum v. Oakland Medical Center.251' The plaintiff in Faigenbaum
was fifty-six year old psychiatric patient suffering from depression and
schizophrenia. Between the years of 1964 and 1966, the patient was
hospitalized for what "may have been manic psychoses" caused by marital
difficulties. 53 At this time, she responded favorably to low doses of
chlorpromazine. 4 The patient was again hospitalized in 1976, suffering
from manic-depression, chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and
hysterical neurosis,255 and she was prescribed chlorpromazine.
-6
Hospitalized for nearly one year, the patient developed a movement
disorder,5 7 incorrectly diagnosed by a staff neurologist as Huntington's
2441d.
245Davis et al., supra note 3, at 121.
246SIMON, supra note 16, at 227.
247APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.248CIites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
2'49Davis et al., supra note 3, at 122.
sOId
2s373 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).









Chorea, rather than TD.2s8 As a result of the misdiagnosis, the hospital
physicians continued to administer antipsychotic drugs for one year until
the patient's family demanded the medication be discontinued." 9
In determining whether the hospital was negligent in treating the
patient, the Faigenbaum court concluded that the hospital physicians
incorrectly diagnosed the patient's condition, failed to monitor the
patient's condition properly, and negligently continued to administer
antipsychotic medication after she displayed clear symptoms of TD.2 t
The trial court, therefore, awarded a $1 million judgment in favor of the
patient.26
1
Faigenbaum illustrates the importance of recognizing TD in a patient
displaying movement disorders pursuant to taking antipsychotic
medication. Interestingly, a controversial issue in Faigenbaum was
whether the patient actually suffered from mental illness. Although the
patient was diagnosed as mentally ill in the 1960s, and responded
favorably to antipsychotic medication, the trial court determined that she
never suffered from mental illness. 2
62
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
awarded nearly $3 million to the plaintiff in Hedin v. United States, where
the plaintiff received outpatient treatment from a VA hospital for a period
of seventeen months, during which time he saw no physician and
continued to receive antipsychotic drugs through the mail.26 In
determining whether the VA physicians were negligent in failing to
monitor the plaintiffs condition, the court noted that the physicians
prescribed an excessive amount of antipsychotic drugs over a prolonged
period of time.2' 6 As it turned out, however, the VA ultimately admitted
that the prescribed doses were excessive, the plaintiff's condition was not
adequately monitored, and the plaintiffs condition had been previously
'S8Faigenbaum v. Oakland Medical Ctr., 373 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 185).
259Gualtieri et al., supra note 5 at 1920..
2
"'Faigenbaum, 373 NAV.2d at 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
261Id. The patient also received approximately S500,000.00 in settlement awards. Id. The
reader should further note that the appellate court reversed the trial court decision against the state
hospital and several of its employees because of governmental immunity. Id, at 166. The
operation of a mental hospital was considered to be a governmental function entitled to immunity
Id. at 164-66.
26
"Faigenbaum, 373 N.V.2d at 162.263No. 5-S3-3 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 1985).
2
"Id. The plaintiff received 600 mg of Thorazine over a four year p2riod.
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diagnosed as untreatable.265 Therefore, the sole issue before the court was
the amount of damages. The court thereafter awarded the plaintiff nearly
$3 million, including a $30,000 loss of consortium award to his ex-wife.266
Hedin is an interesting case because the VA neither disputed causation,
nor raised a contributory negligence defense in light of the plaintiffs
addiction to amphetamines.
In Leal v. Simon,267 the New York Court of Appeals recommended
that a $2.5 million jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff be reduced to $1
million.2 68 The plaintiff in Leal was a mentally retarded patient who
developed TD at the UCPA facility.269 The defendant-physician ordered
a change in the plaintiffs medication from 4 to 2 mg of Haldol, as
needed.270 The medication was administered only if the plaintiff became
hyper or abusive.27' Nearly one month after reducing the patient's Haldol
prescription, the plaintiff regressed and became severely self-abusive. 72
The defendant-physician thereafter prescribed Haldol in dosages fifteen
times higher than the plaintiffs original maintenance amount.2 73 The
plaintiff soon experienced severe side effects such as the inability to eat,
walk, or talk.274
The jury in Leal found the physician negligent. s Expert testimony
supported the jury's determination of negligence based on:
(1) the physician failed to familiarize himself with the plaintiffs medical
history;276
(2) the physician failed to obtain complete medical records and neglected
to review the appropriate medical literature and consult with other
colleagues with regard to the plaintiff s condition; 77 and
26Srd"
266Id. at 18.
267147 A.D.2d 198 (N.Y. 1989).
2681d. at 207.269Id. at 199-200.
2701d. at 201.2711d.
272Leal v. Simon, 147 A.D.2d 198, 201 (N.Y. 1989).273id.
2741d. at 201.21SId. at 203.
2761d. at 204.
2
"Leal v. Simon, 147 A.D.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. 1989).
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(3) the physician was negligent in monitoring the plaintiff's condition,
and he should have restricted the plaintiff to an "at-bed-time" dosage
of Haldol.2s
Interestingly, the physician in Leal explained that his decision to
reduce the medication was prompted by an impending state audit from the
Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities of all UCPA
programs and physician medical records.279 The audit sought to review
whether the UCPA physicians had reduced the overall prescription of
antipsychotic medication, a goal of the UCPA facility because of its
concern for TD and other side effects."' The jury noted this defense and
found the UCPA facility negligent by adding a handwritten "special
finding" in the general verdict.2 11 The appellate court, however, rejected
this finding as "surplusage" and "gratuitous" because the jury was "bound
to render its verdict in the form prescribed by the court.' 2 The UCPA
facility was, nevertheless, found vicariously liable for the negligent acts
of the physician.283 Consequently, that a physician would alter his method
of treatment to avoid administrative interference from a state audit, is one
danger that critics of such audits are quick to point out.
There are several other notable TD verdicts. In Vincent v. Walz,2 4
the plaintiff was prescribed Mellaril for menopausal symptoms and
maintained the prescription for seven years until she developed symptoms
of TD.285 Trial proceeded on the sole issue of damages, after a default
judgment was entered against the defendant-physician for failing to
answer the complaint in a timely manner.216 The jury ultimately awarded
the plaintiff $1.25 million in damages.2 7 In Hudson v. Taras Mental
Health & Retardation Center,28 a Texas court awarded a patient
$820,000.00 in damages after the defendant-physician attempted to treat
the chronically depressed patient with Thorazine and Loxitane, even




'Leal v. Simon, 147 A.D.2d 198, 206 (N.Y. 19S9).
2'Id.
'No. 86-3710 (DeKalb County Sup. Ct, Jan. 14, 198).
28Id.
6Id.
"oId.No. 424,100 (Bexar County Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 1991).
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though she exhibited no signs of schizophrenia.289 The court subsequently
reduced the award to $250,000.00 in compliance with the damages
limitations imposed by the Federal Tort Claims Act.29
Finally, in a products liability case, a Texas court in American
Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson,29' found the defendant, Lederle Laboratories,
negligent for its design and manufacture of the drug Loxitane.292 The
court awarded the patient $2,195,000.00 in compensatory damages and
$500,000.00 in punitive damages.293 Interestingly, the court did not find
the physicians who administered the medication negligent.9 4
Nevertheless, while there are relatively few TD verdicts on record, there
are several reported settlement agreements.295
In some situations, a patient may develop TD even though the
clinician diligently follows the applicable standard of care. There are a
number of TD-related cases where the defendant-physician and/or hospital
was found not liable even though the patient experienced a "bad result"
from the treatment.296 This is common during the pleading stage when, for
example, the patient fails to establish proximate cause or the applicable
statute of limitations has expired.2 97 Where the patient fails to inform the
289ld.
2 901d.




29SSome of the more noteworthy settlements include: Snider v. Harding, No. 84-CV-06-
3582 (Franklin Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas August, 1988) where a $800,000 settlement was reached
after a 34 year old male teacher developed TD resulting from negligent treatment of acute
psychotic episodes with a medication called Navane; Urbani v. Yale University School of
Medicine, No. 85-46EBB (Conn. 1986) a $30,000 settlement was reached even though the 15 year
old plaintiff recovered from initial TD symptoms.
2'For examples of TD defense verdicts see: Rivera v. N.Y.C. Health and Hospital Corp, No.
27536/82 (Nev York Sup. Ct. 1988) where the defense argued that plaintiff had only one
incidence of torticollis and it was attributable to stress, so Thorazine did not have to be
discontinued; Haney v. Serbin, No. 90-430 (Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas April
19, 1991) where defense successfully asserted Triavil was appropriately prescribed for depression
and other physical problems; Durell v. Mawhinney, No. 482189 (San Diego Sup. Ct. July 22,
1988) where defense successfully asserted Haldol was appropriately prescribed; Cleary v. Eugenia
Hospital, No. 85-11-03593 (Philadelphia County Ct. Common Pleas, Dec..mber 1991) where
defense successfully asserted plaintiff did not suffer from TD but had Huntington's chorea.
297For examples of three of approximately 10 TD cases dealing with the statute of
limitations defense see Barnhart v. United States, 884 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1989); Bolen v. United
States, 727 F.Supp. 1346 (Idaho 1989); Gatling v. Pema, 788 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. 1990).
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physician of any known side effects from the medication, contributory
negligence may also serve as a bar to complete recovery.2 93
INFORMED CONSENT
Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician must disclose
sufficient information that would allow a patient to make an "informed"
decision about a proposed treatment. 99 In Canterbury v. Spence,cs the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia explained that,
"true consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the
options available and the risks attendant upon each." 30' At least one court
has indicated that "every person has a right to determine and control what
is to be done to his or her body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits [a battery] for which he is liable for
damages."'3 2 The requirement of informed consent seeks to promote,
among other things, greater patient autonomy, the preservation of the
patient's livelihood, self-regulation and rational decision making by the
physician, and greater public involvement in medical decision making."
Physician liability for lack of informed consent is premised on two
legal theories: (1) the intentional tort of battery; and (2) negligence. In the
context of TD litigation, a patient might allege battery, since the failure to
disclose potential side effects of antipsychotic drug use is tantamount to
treatment without consent.3 4 Similarly, a TD patient might allege
negligence in the event she was not adequately informed of the risks and
implications necessary to make an informed decision as to whether to
submit to such treatment."' In the latter situation, the patient asserts that,
"had the physician disclosed the risk and implications of antipsychotic
drug use, I would not have consented to the treatment." Moreover, a
claim based on lack of informed consent does not require that the
physician provide the "best"or "optimal" treatment; rather, a lack of
SSee Tisdale v. Johnson, 339 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 19S6).
3SIMON & SADOFF, supra note 142 at 101.
3 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3011d.
3"Schoendorffv. New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
303SION & SADOFF, supra note 142, at 102.304id.30sld
"
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informed consent claim merely requires the physician to provide treatment
consistent with the standard of care.3
0 6
Three basic elements comprise the informed consent requirement:
(1) knowledge of the risks;
(2) patient competency; and
(3) voluntariness of the consent. °7
Traditionally, the scope of disclosure has been determined by "what a
reasonable medical practitioner would disclose under the same or similar
circumstances." '3 s This standard was challenged in 1972 when the court
in Canterbury v. Spence3°9 rejected the reasonable practitioner approach,
adopting instead the objective or "reasonable patient" approach. 310 This
approach, according to the court, requires the physician to disclose all
known "material risks" to the patient.31' A risk is therefore material, the
court stated, "when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether to forego the
proposed therapy."312 The court rejected the substantive standard by
stating that a standard based upon the opinions of a physician could not
regulate patient rights. 313
Significantly, Canterbury does not stand for the proposition that a
physician is required to disclose every risk that is theoretically possible.314
Rather, the court indicated the category of risks the physician should
communicate "is no broader than the complement he could
communicate."3"5 The duty to disclose, the court determined, may extend
to any risk the physician has actual knowledge of, excluding of course,
301Id. at 99.
3
"TMills et al., Consent and Liability with Neuroleptics: The Problem of Tardive Dyskinesla,
8 INT. J. LAW PSYCHIATRY 243,248 (1986).30 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
3°9464 F.2d 772 (D.C Cir. 1972).31OId
"31id.
"
2ld. at 786 (citing Waltz & Scheunenan, Informed Consent To Therapy, 64 N.W.U.L.
REv. 628, 640 (1970)).
"'SIMON & SADOFF, supra note 142, at 102.
3'41d. at 103.3
"SCanterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 722, 786, n.84 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (referring to Block v.
McVay, 126 N.W.2d 808, 812 (S.D. 1964)).
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those risks that the physician is unaware exist.31 6 Thus, nondisclosure of
an unknown risk, according to the court, "does not, strictly speaking,
present a problem in terms of the duty to disclose although it very well
might pose problems in terms of the physician's duties to have known of
it and to have acted accordingly., 31
7
Physicians should therefore incorporate five general categories of
disclosure into their method of treatment:
(1) the diagnosis;
(2) an overview of the proposed treatment;
(3) a description of the most likely risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment;
(4) alternative treatments, if any; and
(5) the prognosis.3"
Treatment posing great risks obliges the physician to disclose even
relatively remote risks, especially if alternative therapies are available.319
Consequently, because of its relatively high prevalence/incidence rates,
and its potentially permanent nature, physicians have both an ethical and
legal obligation to disclose the risks of TD to a patient.
Patient competency is another element of informed consent.3 " The
law presumes a patient to be competent unless judicially determined
otherwise.321  Courts employ four standards to determine patient
competency:
(1) ability to communicate choice;
(2) whether the patient comprehends the information provided to him;
(3) recognition of alternative forms of treatment; and
(4) ability to make rational decisions.3u
While most lawyers define patient competency in cognitive terms, courts
tend to focus on the patient's ability to communicate choice and the level
316Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786, n. 84 (referring to Waltz & Scheunernan, Informed Consent
To Therapy, 64 N.W.U.L. REV. 628, 630-35 (1970)).
317Id
31ISIMON & SADOFF, supra note 142, at 103-04.
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of comprehension the patient displays.323 Nevertheless, true informed
consent is generally believed to exist when the patient makes a rational
decision to undergo treatment after being fully apprised of the risks and
benefits of the given treatment.324
Determining patient competency is critical to the administration of
antipsychotic drugs. With respect to an incompetent patient, the physician
should obtain consent by means of a proxy as soon as clinically
possible.325 If a patient's competency level is questionable, commentators
recommend that the psychiatrist obtain consent from both the patient and
a proxy.32 6 Also, in the event a patient experiences prolonged psychosis,
the physician should seek a judicial declaration of competency, or lack
thereof.3 27 The physician must acknowledge a competent patient's right to
refuse antipsychotic medication.32 ' Legal and ethical problems often arise
in those situations where the patient, who is borderline competent, refuses
antipsychotic medication for fear of developing TD.3 29
The final element of informed consent is voluntariness. Here, the
patient should never be coerced into accepting or rejecting treatment,
either by threats of punishment or promises of favored treatment.330 One
example of coercion is when physicians condition television privileges
upon taking antipsychotic medication.






325Mills, supra note 307, at 249.
326 d.
327Id. From a liability standpoint, the physician should never "assume" the patient is
competent.
1SION, supra note 16, at 225. A more detailed discussion of the "right to refuse" issue
and its relationship to TD and antipsychotic medication will be done in the next section. This is
a very complex issue and proper exploration is impossible in the scope of this article. The right
to refuse medication or treatment is a foundation for informed consent and has the same
philosophical underpinnings. The tension between autonomy and paternalism runs to the heart of
the right to refuse issue. Further, the problem of TD exacerbates this tension in the right to refuse
antipsychotic medication. Again, much of this tension could be alleviated if the medical and legal
community placed primacy on the ethical value of respect for persons in medical and legal
treatment analysis. Id.
3291d.




(3) therapeutic privilege; and
(4) waiver.331
The patient, for example, may request that the physician not disclose any
potential risks of treatment.3 2 The physician might invoke therapeutic
privilege if disclosure of an uncommon risk will place undue stress upon
the patient and thereby cause the patient to refuse treatment. 3 There
should be little reason, however, to use the therapeutic privilege exception
because any patient can gradually be exposed to stressful information at
repeated intervals of time.3 4
Physicians must treat informed consent as an ongoing process rather
than a limited method of disclosure occurring at a single point in time.3 5
This view is especially appropriate for psychiatrists treating patients with
schizophrenia. A 1982 study revealed that many schizophrenic patients,
previously informed of the risk of TD, lacked the capacity to retain the
information necessary to make an informed decision.3 ' The patients did
not appear to comprehend the nature and implications of the consent
form.337 In light of this, the study recommended continuous sharing of
information between the physician and patient.338
Another controversial aspect of informed consent, especially in the
context of TD, is determining which staff member should disclose the
risks and implications of treatment to the patient. Absent hospital
guidelines, informal delegation, often referred to as "buck-passing," may
occur.339 Moreover, in those situations where the patient seldomly
communicates with the physician, the likelihood of inadequate disclosure
is profound.3 ° Therefore, and as a matter of good practice, the hospital




"3'Latimer, supra note 26, at 53.
... Munetz et al., Tardive Dyskinesia and Informed Consent: Myths and Rcalitics, 10 BULL.
AMI. ACAD. PSYCHIATRYLAW77, 88 (1982).
33 Id. at 86.
3381d.
33"iunetz, Overcoming Resistance to Talking to Patients About Tardive Dyskinesia, 36
HosPrrAL COMMuNITY PSYCHIATRY 283,284 (19S5).
39Id.
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exceptions to informed consent, and encourage members to collaborate in
their effort to disclose relevant information to the patient.341
Determining the proper method of disclosure is yet another
controversial aspect of informed consent. A 1985 study indicated that
therapists prefer a stringent disclosure program that incorporates a
risk/benefit evaluation of antipsychotic medication.342 This may include,
among other things, the periodic administration of an AIMS examination,
questionnaires used to gauge patient knowledge before and after
disclosure, and patient medication instruction sheets. 43 Group study is
another effective disclosure method. Here, patients can express their
concerns with TD, as opposed to the burden of psychosis. 44
The same 1985 study also found that oral consent used in conjunction
with a stringent disclosure program, had a greater impact on the patient
than a written consent form.345 In fact, in a 1991 report, the APA
expressed dissatisfaction with the use of written consent forms as a
method of disclosing the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug
use.346 Careless application of written consent forms, commentators
suggest, stifles communication between the patient and physician,347
which may increase malpractice exposure, especially since the patient's
decision to undergo treatment was heavily influenced by sources other
than herself. 348
Some commentators argue that use of a written consent form detracts
from the benefits of joint decision making between the patient and
physician.349 These individuals urge physicians to reject the written
consent form in favor of a non-threatening, verbal explanation of the risks
and benefits of antipsychotic medication.35°
Clinicians may nevertheless reject the findings of the APA Report for
the following reasons:
341id.
m'2 d. at 286.
3431d.
344Id.
'5Id. There is an ongoing debate over which method of consent is more effective, oral or
written consent.
3'6APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
3471d.
348Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 163, at 345.
349Id
3"SIMON, supra note 16, at 224.
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(1) state mandated use of written consent forms;
(2) convenience;
(3) corporate policy; and
(4) lack of familiarity with other types of disclosure?"'
Irrespective of the rationale behind rejecting the APA's findings,
clinicians must realize that courts can invalidate the written consent form
in light of public policy considerations such as unconscionability,
vagueness, patient incompetence, and even duress.3 -5
In a 1985 comparative analysis between TD patients informed of the
risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug treatment through a written
consent form, and TD patients informed verbally, the patients who
received verbal disclosure retained more information within two months
after testing than the other patients.353 Accordingly, clinicians who are
required to use written consent forms should attempt to incorporate verbal
disclosure into the clinician-patient relationship. A therapeutic alliance
between the clinician and patient would place the clinician "next to" rather
than "across from" the patient.3 ' Because malpractice litigation is often
triggered by physician arrogance, indifference, insensitivity, and the
"malignant synergy of a bad outcome in the context of bad feelings,)3 5
continuous communication between the clinician and patient may reduce
these "bad feelings" and counter the terrible experience of suffering from
schizophrenia all alone. Patience and respect for the patient is likewise
a necessary component of informed consent because many psychotics
require additional time to develop a trusting relationship with the
physician.356 Also, psychological support may enable a borderline
competent patient "to conduct a risk-benefit analysis sufficient to give a
valid consent to treatment." 35 7
The last controversial issue surrounding informed consent is
determining when disclosure should occur. The APA has indicated the
... Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 346.
'sWettstein, supra note 168, at 101. Written consent forms are often extensive and quite
difficult to comprehend because they are written at a post-graduate level.
353MunetZ & Roth, Informing Patients About Tardive Dysfinesia 42 ARCHL Gm.
PSYCHIATRY 866, 869 (1985).
3'GUTHEIL ET AL., supra note 25, at 80.
3"'Id. at 82.
3SMIfON, ,supra note 16, at 224.3'Id.
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"patient or legal guardian should be informed of the risk [of TD] as soon
as clinically feasible, especially in cases when the patient [demonstrates]
signs of the condition and the physician is considering resuming
medication.""35 The phrase "as soon as clinically feasible" has sparked
debate among commentators because of its lack of clarity. Several
commentators argue that the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug use
should be disclosed prior to treatment, unless an emergency or therapeutic
privilege exists. 359 Thus, failure to disclose prior to treatment may
increase a patient's cumulative intake of drugs, thereby increasing the
likelihood of a malpractice claim against the physician.36 If the clinician
must resume the administration of antipsychotic drugs to a patient with
TD, there is no justifiable delay, absent an emergency. 61
The question often arises as to when the risks and implications of
antipsychotic drug use should be disclosed to an acutely psychotic patient.
In most cases, acute psychosis will remit within two months and at that
point, there should be full disclosure and patient consent.36 Nevertheless,
as a safety measure, the physician should always document why there was
no disclosure and/or patient consent prior to treatment, or within a
relatively short time thereof.
There still remains widespread physician resistance. to informed
consent guidelines.363 Some physicians characterize informed consent as
a "legalistic fiction" because they believe a fully-informed patient might
refuse necessary treatment if provided with "too much" information,
thereby reducing the physician's ability to treat illnesses such as
schizophrenia." To the contrary, other studies have suggested that
patients are rarely "frightened out of treatment" after receiving full
disclosure of the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug treatment
and TD.365 According to these studies, TD disclosure increases the level
of trust between the patient and physician, and mitigates the impact when
alarming information is conveyed to the patient.366
358APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
359SIMON, supra note 16, at 221. See also Mills, supra note 307, at 245360SIMON, supra note 16, at 221.3611d. at 224.362Id. at 132.
363Munetz, supra note 339, at 283.36Wettstein, supra note 168, at 97.365Munetz, supra note 339, at 283.3611d. at 284.
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It must be emphasized that a mentally ill patient is not per se unable
to comprehend the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug
treatment.367 A 1985 study indicated that mentally ill patients are nearly
as capable of appreciating the risks and implications of antipsychotie drug
as other patients.3 63 A 1983 study similarly revealed that while acute
schizophrenic patients are less likely to comprehend the risks and
implications of antipsychotic drug treatment, post-acute schizophrenic
patients respond well to detailed, yet informal, discussions concerning the
risks of antipsychotic drug use.369
Lack of informed consent is most acute in state hospitals and nursing
homes. 370 A 1988 study involving ninety-one elderly patients, 44 percent
of whom were taking antipsychotic drugs, revealed a genuine lack of
informed consent.37' The same study also revealed that 82 percent of the
patients in a state mental hospital clearly demonstrated a lack of
familiarity with the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug treatment, and
were therefore, unable to properly consent to the treatment.
372
Unfortunately, not even the most conscientious physicians and
careful institutional regulations can overcome all the barriers to providing
informed consent to many schizophrenic patients. These patients have
difficulty processing information, they have lower literacy skills, and
-67SioN, supra note 16, at 222.
3'Stanley et al., PsyWopharmacologic Treatment and Informed Conscnt. Empzrical
Research, 21 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 110, 113 (1985). This study did indicate that
schizophrenic patients have more difficulty in the consent process than patients with major
affective disorders. But the study did show that factors other than medicated or non-mczditcd
and psychiatric or non-psychiatric are more important in the consent process. Factors such as
verbal ability and practical reasoning are more indicative of competency to give informed consent.
Id.
69See Marder et al., A Comparison of Patients who Refuse and Conscnt to Ncurolqvte
Treatment, 140 A.Mi. I PSYCHIATRY 470 (1983).
370A 1985 study indicated that 50 pecent of community placement facilities administered
informed consent. A recent study completed in 1994 indicated 73.8 percent had policies of
obtaining informed consent, 73.7 percent used a consent form, 17.8 percent used a checklist, 73.7
percent used documentation of a verbal discussion, 5.9 percent used a patient information sheet,
61 percent used a combination of techniques, and 56.8 percent incorporated a consent form and
documented discussion. Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 163, at 345. Unfortunately, another
study indicated that only 11.5 percent of public hospital psychiatrists were aware of state policies
regarding risk disclosure. See Kennedy & Sanbom, supra note 232, at 93.
'
1tBeck Determining Competency to Assent to Neuroleptic Drug Treatment, 39 HOSPiTAL
COMMUNITY PsYcHIATRY 1106, 1110 (198S).
321d.
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many schizophrenics' primary focus is to avoid relapse at all costs.373
Other barriers to informed consent exist because some psychotic patients
deny they have TD, and many of the elderly have no family to provide
proxy consent.374
It is important for physicians to document the patient's actual
understanding and consent in the medical record to further protect herself
from legal liability alleging lack of informed consent.375 The APA's Task
Force on TD has stated that "careful documentation of the disclosure
process is recommended. Further, the clinician should note what she told
the patient, what the patient said and understood, and how a treatment
decision was reached."'376 One commentator cited the following defenses
that can be used to defend a malpractice claim alleging lack of informed
consent:
(1) common knowledge of the risk;
(2) waiver;
(3) therapeutic privilege;
(4) a written consent form;
(5) the fact that a reasonable person would have undergone the treatment
anyway;
(6) no expert medical testimony; and
(7) insubstantial risk.
While TD litigation stemming from the lack of informed consent is
still relatively uncommon, the majority of reported cases involve mentally
retarded and elderly patients. 377  In Clites, the court determined the
physician failed to properly inform Timothy's family of he risk of TD. 3 71
The parents, as proxy, were never informed of the potential side effects of
the prolonged use of maj or tranquilizers, nor did they consent to the use.379
The industry standard, according to the court, required Timothy's parents
to be apprised of the dangers and benefits of the prescribed treatment
'
3 Munetz & Roth, supra note 353, at 870.
374Munetz, supra note 339, at 284.
375Davis et al., supra note 3, at 124.376APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
377Id




program?"0 Also, the court indicated that while consent need not always
be in writing, the physician must make "reasonable disclosure to the
patient of the nature and probable consequences of the suggested or
recommended treatment." 31 The court further indicated that even if a
physician is not required to describe in detail all possible risks of the
treatment, as this may alarm the patient, the physician should,
nevertheless, disclose all material risks? Finally, the Clites court
rejected the notion of "implied consent. '3' 3 The court acknowledged that
although Timothy's parents may have known Timothy was receiving
medication, "they were not informed of the risks attendant to the treatment
program.' '314 Because the parents were ignorant of the potential dangers
of the treatment program, the court concluded there was "no basis for
saying [the parents] impliedly consented to the administration of major
tranquilizers by their failure to object."3"5 The court, therefore, upheld the
damages award against the hospital.3S6
The Supreme Court of Texas similarly addressed the issue of
informed consent in Barclay v. Campbell, where plaintiff ("Milton")
developed TD after he was prescribed neuroleptic drugs by the defendant-
physician in an effort to treat his mental illness ss Thereafter, Milton
brought a malpractice claim against the physician, alleging the physician
negligently prescribed the neuroleptic drugs and failed to disclose the risks
associated with the drugs.388 On the issue of informed consent, the court
determined the focus was not whether Milton could have been influenced
in making a decision to give or withhold consent to the procedure had he
known of the risk. Rather, the issue was "whether a reasonable person
could have been influenced in making a decision to give or withhold
consent to the procedure had he known of the risk."'3s" If a reasonable









s5Id. One interesting aspect of Clites is that the hospital asked the parents' p-rmission to
use their son's picture at a presentation, but did not think it necessary to ask for their prmnission
in using antipsychotic drugs. Id.
387704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986).3s31Id.3S91d. at 10.
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determined, "was also entitled to be warned of the risk."' 9 Based on
those facts, the court concluded that the issue of informed consent should
have been submitted to the jury.391
Both Clites and Barclay support the proposition that courts are
visibly concerned with the lack of informed consent in antipsychotic drug
treatment. As more of these cases are litigated, physicians and lawyers
alike, will become more familiar with the appropriate disclosure and
patient consent guidelines applicable to antipsychotic drug treatment,
improving the overall standard of care in antipsychotic drug treatment.
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
A patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment is a controversial
issue which causes much strife betveen the medical and legal
communities.392 As the risks of antipsychotic drug use become more
identifiable, the right to refuse treatment issue will gain paramount
importance in the context of antipsychotic drug treatment.393 The past
abuse of antipsychotic drugs in the 1960s and 1970s is a vivid example of
why there should be safeguards governing a patient's right to refuse
medication.394 Whether a patient has a right to refuse treatment often
incorporates constitutional implications such as:
(1) freedom of speech;
(2) prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;
(3) due process guarantees;
(4) equal protection;
(5) freedom of religion; and
(6) the right to privacy.395
Legal commentators attribute the high risk of TD as the main reason
why competent patients, institutionalized or not, deserve the right to refuse
"'Old. at 10-11.391Id. at 11.392Perr, Refusing Treatment --Who Shall Decide? 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW
233,235 (1982).
3931d.
394B. WEINER & R. WE-TrsTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 120 (1993).3951d. at 125. See also Perr, supra note 392, at 311.
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antipsychotic medication.396 The same holds true for decisions made by
incompetent patients. However, in the latter situation, the patient's
decision to refuse antipsychotic medication should be subject to judicial
review.3 97 Advocates of the right to refuse medication have adopted the
rationale espoused in Rogers v. Ok/n,398 where the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts commented on the constitutional
implications of a patient's right to refuse mind-altering psychotic drugs:
The concept of a right of privacy also embodies First Amendment
concerns. It is clear from the evidence in this case that psychotic
medication has the potential to affect and change a patient's
mood, attitude, and capacity to think .... At stake is the [sic]
fundamental question as to whether the state may impose once
again on the privacy of a person, already deprived of freedom
through commitment by forcibly injecting mind-altering drugs
into his system in a non-emergency situation.'
The Rogers court further stated:
The right to produce a thought -- or refuse to do so - is as
important as the right protected in Roe v. Wade to give birth or
abort. Implicit in an individual's right to choose either abortion or
birth is an underlying right to think and decide. Without the
capacity to think, we merely exist, not function. Realistically, the
capacity to think and decide is a fundamental element of
freedom 0 °
The legal community did well exposing the abuses, neglect, and ignorance
in the state hospital at the time. Its goal of improving patient care and
defending patients' rights/liberty was laudable, but the legal community
went too far and paradoxically diminished psychotic patients' liberty and
quality of care. Why do patients refuse medication and what should the
legal and medical communities do when refusal of antipsychotic
medication occurs?
... WEINER & NVETTSTEIN, supra note 394, at 131.
3971d.
...478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
3'9Id. at 1366.401d.
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Patients who experience delusions often refuse antipsychotic
medication as a result of the symptomatic nature of their illness. 401 Many
of these patients possess an unrealistic fear of the effects of antipsychotic
drug treatment, often associating the administration of depot medication
as a form of bodily assault.02 While legal advocates aust respect a
competent patient's decision to forego antipsychotic drug treatment, the
same does not necessarily hold true for patients who experience delusions,
as many of these patients expressly deny the very existence of their
illness.4°3 Therefore, the decision not to administer antipsychotic drugs to
a patient who experiences delusions must be, to a large part, based on
medical information, usually to the exclusion of the patient's delusion-
induced requests.
Other patients temporarily refuse medication because of problems
with the staff or their own family.4°5 The voluntary patient has the right
to leave the hospital if she does not wish to cooperate with the prescribed
treatment. But the "well-meaning" legal advocate who defends the "right"
of an involuntary patient to refuse antipsychotic treatment ventures into
dangerous territory if not in possession of all the medical facts or if the
lawyer does not understand the nuances of the treatment pian.406
When medication is given, the patient can recover, go home, and
have her liberty restored.4°7 After the patient regains competency then the
patient can make an informed decision whether or not to continue taking
medication. The legal community should understand that involuntary
patients were committed because they posed a risk to themselves and/or
the community and were unable to rationally participate in any treatment
decision. 40 8 Legal advocates must begin to appreciate how illogical it is
401Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 467.4




4Courts in their zeal to prevent past abuses maybe depriving patients of the best treatment
available. As explained earlier in the article, judges may be relying on heavily biased and
inaccurate law review articles in their determinations of the risk/benefits of antipsychotic drugs.
An important function of this article is to help eradicate any biases, pretudices, or faulty
information regarding antipsychotic drugs and their risk/benefits. Although reasonable people
may disagree on certain issues surrounding the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, it is
unreasonable not to be educated and objective regarding the medical information.
40SWEINER & WETrsTEIN, supra note 394, at 131.4
'See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 441.
417Id. at 450.40 1d. at 442.
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to commit a patient involuntarily and then assert the patient has the "right'
to refuse the treatment necessary to regain both competency and liberty.
Those who advocate the "right to refuse" treatment seek to eliminate
institutionalization as a factor in determining whether to acknowledge the
patient's rejection of treatment.4 9 To the extent these advocates are
concerned, a competent, yet institutionalized, patient's rejection of
antipsychotic medication must be respected.410 If the institutionalized
patient is incompetent, ajudicial hearing should be held to determine the
patient's best interests and whether the patient would in fact benefit from
antipsychotic drug treatment.41 ' Because the court in the latter situation
is the ultimate decision maker, disputes often arise concerning the ability
of a judge to implement final orders on technical medical issues like
TD.412
A patient's right to refuse treatment has impacted the medical
community in several other ways. A 1990 study, for example,
documented the purported impact of Rivers v. Katz, 413 a 1986 New York
Appellate Court decision, which held that in a nonemergency situation, a
patient previously adjudged legally unable to make an informed decision,
may be compelled to submit to antipsychotic drug treatment, irrespective
of the fact the patient does not wish to undergo such treatment 14 The
study revealed that competency hearings increased the average amount of
time necessary to resolve a treatment dilemma 415 While the resolution of
refusal-disputes occurring in a private hospital averaged ten days prior to
the Rivers decision, the study revealed that the same disputes averaged a
thirty-one day resolution period after Rivers. 6 Consistent with these
findings, the study also revealed that while resolution of refusal-disputes
at a public hospital averaged twenty-one days pre-Rivers, the same
disputes averaged a sixty-eight day resolution period post-Rivers.1 The
4
'Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Mcdications Retrospect
and Prospect, 145 AMi. J. PsYCHiATRY413, 416 (1988).
410Id. This is the same view articulated by the court in Rogers V. Oin, 47S F. Supp. 1342
(D. Mass. 1979)
4121d.
413495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
4141d
"
4 sCiecone et al., Right to Refuse Treatment: Impact of Rivrs v Katz, 1 BU A,%1. ACAD.
PsYcHIATRY & L. 203,210 (1990).416id.
4171d.
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study further indicated that while judicial denial of a patient's request to
refuse treatment decreased from 2.9 percent to 1.2 percent after Rivers,
only 6 percent of the patients expressing a desire to stop treatment actually
received a judicial hearing.418 Consequently, while hospitals and
physicians during the pre-Rivers era encouraged patients to inquire about
the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug use, the study revealed
that since the Rivers decision, health care workers have been less inclined
to refute a patient's request to discontinue antipsychotic medication.419
The study attributed this decrease to the time delay involved with formal
competency hearings, and noted that on average, patients would not
receive medication anywhere from one to three months prior to the
initiation of the hearing.420
There is real harm that may result from the refusal of antipsychotic
medication and the subsequent delay in the judicial process. For those
patients awaiting a formal competency hearing, the Ciccone study found
a regression in the mental health of some patients, many of whom
ultimately required emergency medication, seclusion, and even physical
421 teerestraint. In the event the patient becomes physically violent, other
patients and staff members are the most obvious victims. 422 Thus, the
ironic aspect of the "rights driven approach" is that a patient exercising her
right to refuse treatment may ultimately be physically restrained by staff
members. Consequently, while respect for the patient's freedom of choice
is critical, it is yet to be determined whether the perils of withholding
treatment outweighs this right.
In addition to potentially violent consequences, the patient may
experience permanent mental and/or physical damage as a result of the
4Mid. at 211.
4191d.4201d. at 212. Note that in 12 studies studying 5,000 cases of patient refusals, the court
sustained only 3 percent of these refusals with a time delay of 48 days on average. Not one of the
studies reported clinical benefit to the patient from a delay in treatment. Brakel & Davis, supra
note 6, at 456. It is interesting to note that judges sustained only 3 percent of these treatment
refusals. Researchers have concluded that judges have tended to still think like physicians (but
without the training) when forced to make treatment decisions. Consequently, rights based cases
like Rogers and Rivers have not cause the "collapse of the mental health profession" as some
clinicians have feared; but the delays caused by these decisions have resulted n more harm than
the legal community would like to admit. Id.4211d. at 213.422WEINR & WETSTEIN, supra note 394, at 120.
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delay in treatment.4 3 Treatment delays incur institutional costs and harms
as well. Hospitals must assume a custodial position for the patient, and
the estimated cost of hospitalization over a four and one-half month period
is $50,000.00.424
Commentators from both the medical and legal communities believe
that a "treatment-driven 425 approach may reduce the controversy
surrounding a patient's "right to refuse" treatment, and simultaneously
improve the quality of patient care in these situations.426 The treatment-
driven approach suggests that a patient's right to refuse treatment should
be determined prior to hospitalization and without a separate judicial
hearing.427 Under this approach, the patient is protected because her rights
are fully documented in a judicial hearing prior to hospitalization. 4 3
Moreover, since competency is determined prior to hospitalization,
treatment is facilitated and the conundrum of confinement can be
avoided.429 Finally, the patient under the treatment-driven approach may
assert her right to refuse medication after recovery, when she is
competent.430
The treatment-driven approach has found legislative support in Utah,
Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, Delaware, and South Carolina, where statutes
expressly authorize this mode of decision making.43' Skeptics, however,
are concerned with whether the right to refuse treatment can be preserved
once the patient has been hospitalized.4-2 To counter this problem, patient
treatment plans should be periodically reviewed by specially designated
review teams and independent psychiatrists.433 In addition, the patient
42
-Id. at 457.
424 1d. at 460.4
'This model is also referred to as the "medical model" approach.42Appelbaum & Gutheil, The Right to Refuse Treatment: The Real Issue is Qualit, of Care,
9 BULL. Ai. ACAD. PSYCIHATRY & L. 199,201 (1982).
4
'Appelbaum, supra note 409, at 416.
4
"Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Pschiatrists Should and Can Make it Work,
38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 362 (1981).4191d. at 362.43 Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 450.
43
.Id. at 470 (An example of such a statute can be found in UTAH CODE AIZ,. Sec. 62A-12-
234(c) (1991)).
432Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 470.433id.
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may request a formal review by the institution once every raonth or two,
and there is always the opportunity for a judicial hearing.434
Independent clinical review is yet another approach used by several
states. Under this approach, if the patient refuses treatment, the hospital
conducts an independent clinical review to determine patient competency
and the appropriateness of the patient's treatment plan.435 In Rennie v.
Klein,436 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
New Jersey's independent clinical review policy against a due process
attack, when it determined the decision to administer antipsychotic drugs
against a patient's will "must be based on accepted professional judgment
and the procedures specified in New Jersey Administrative Bulletin 78-3
satisfied due process requirements. '
4 37
One problem with clinical review was identified in Rogers, where
certain hospitalized patients might not receive treatment if they are
determined to be competent.43s Therefore, the question arises as to what
can be done with these patients who are hospitalized without the prospect
of treatment.439
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the right to refuse treatment
is a controversial issue that plagues both medical and legal communities.
Paradoxically, the patient who desires to discontinue treatment, may often
find himself physically and involuntarily confined to a mental hospital for
several months longer than anticipated. Furthermore, as many members
of the medical community assert that the right to refuse treatment is not a
solution to the underlying problem of inadequate patient care, maybe these
individuals should concentrate their efforts to promote the patient's right
to proper and effective treatment,440 especially since a disproportionately
low number of patients actually refuse treatment.441
4 Id. at 471. The patient would receive treatment during the interim period. See Brakel and
Davis, supra note 6, at 471.435Brakel & Davei, supra note 6, at 471.
436720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983).4371d. at 268-69.
43 Rogers v. Okin, 478 F.Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).439Appelbaum, supra note 409, at 415.
401d. at 201.




The ultimate goal of a careful risk-benefit analysis of TD is, obviously,
improving patient care. Yet, the benefits of a consistent utilization of such
an analysis will undoubtedly stretch much further. As tension within the
medical community diminishes, the road will be paved for the
development of concrete legal and judicial standards. As these fact-based
principles emerge, societal tensions will be mitigated and most
importantly, clinicians will have clear treatment paths which they can
consistently implement and trust. Although we lack the answers to all the
problems associated with TD, as consensus grows and cooperation is
fostered, the medical, legal, and social consequences will inevitably be
greatly minimized.
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